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In this paper, I suggest that a major challenge of much safety culture research is that it runs the risk of neglecting the organizational, meso level. Consequentially, it often seems to lack a proper conceptualization of the relationship between culture, technology and structure in high‐risk organizations. High‐reliability organizations (HRO) research, on the other hand, focuses on this relationship. The aim of the paper is to develop an understanding of safety culture that incorporates some of the HRO approach's insights regarding the relationship between safety, culture, technology and structure. I outline and discuss the research on safety culture and the HRO approach's treatment of culture and safety, before I suggest a sociotechnical understanding of safety culture.

The research on organizational accidents shows that both safety culture and complex technology make members of high‐risk organizations blind to hazards and signals of danger. I discuss how these forms of ignorance can be reduced by means of cultural redundancy, which I understand as the organizational promotion of several co‐existing frames of reference of equal standing. This approach is contrary to the main stream research on safety culture, which promotes the ideal of a 'unitary safety culture'. Previous research shows that organizational learning occur trough comparison of perspectives and reflection upon practice. I argue that cultural redundancy is a precondition for processes of learning and culture change that may reduce ignorance to hazards and signals of danger in high‐risk organizations. Such processes are, however, contingent on a climate of trust and openness in which co‐existing safety cultures can meet and set forth processes of organizational learning.

AbstractWhile social vulnerability assessments should play a crucial part in disaster management, there is a lack of assessment tools that retain sensitivity to the situation‐specific dynamics of vulnerabilities emerging in particular hazard scenarios. We developed a novel scenario‐based vulnerability assessment framework together with practitioners in crisis management and assessed the suitability of its components in three past crises and their scenario‐based derivations: a large‐scale power outage, the COVID‐19 pandemic, and a cyber‐attack. Rather than deterministically concluding about vulnerability based on prefixed factors, the framework guides relevant stakeholders to systematically think through categories of vulnerability pertinent to a scenario. We used a table‐top exercise, interviews, and focus groups to demonstrate how the framework broadens the crisis managers' understanding of the scope of factors that may cause vulnerability, the related sources of information and enables to identify individuals burdened by certain vulnerability mixes. The new framework could be applied to different types of crises to enhance preparedness, demand‐driven relief and rescue during critical events.

AbstractWhile there is still a vast body of scholarly research in crisis and disaster management that considers social capital an asset for lessening negative impacts from crises, this paper investigates an underexplored aspect of social capital—its microlevel positive and negative instances in the crisis response—a quite neglected phase of the crisis management cycle when it comes to studying the role of social capital. To underline social capital's double‐edged aspects, this paper draws from the handful of studies that focus on individual social capital in crisis response, to systematize their findings according to bonding, bridging, and linking social capital and positive and negative impacts. In addition, the paper considers these findings to analyze the 2011 Utøya terrorist attack in Norway, to uncover new positive and negative effects of individual social capital, thus contributing to pushing the research agenda toward a more critical appraisal of individual social capital.