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Agreements concerning inter-institutional rules in the treaties of the European Union often give rise to reactions and processes of adaptation within the EU institutions. Recent literature on EU legislative politics has increasingly examined decision-making within the EU institutions, but has largely overlooked how these internal processes react and adapt to changes in relations between the EU bodies. To fill this gap the authors present a series of empirical studies that examine how shifts in inter-institutional rules and procedures affect intra-institutional politics. They show that the resulting intra-institutional adaptations may in turn both have distributive consequences and affect the efficiency of the initial inter-institutional reforms. In addition, they provide some stepping stones for theory-building on how treaty reforms affect organisational structure and decision-making within the EU institutions by outlining a series of mediating variables that link these two types of change processes. Adapted from the source document.

A common argument against flexible integration as a solution to increased preference heterogeneity is that a likely consequence for those member states opting out of the enhanced cooperation is a loss of status and influence generally in the European Union (EU). It has been argued, for example, that the decisions by Denmark, Sweden and the UK not to join the Euro is considered to be free-riding, which leads to a bad reputation and exclusion from informal networks. We test this proposed free-rider effect by comparing the network capital of Euro-outsiders with insiders in the Council of the EU, using survey data of more than 600 member state representatives. The findings speak strongly against the free-rider hypothesis, as the Euro-outsiders are highly ranked in terms of network capital.

We test the commonly stated, but rarely investigated, assertion that making political institutions more transparent is an effective method for combating corruption. This assertion is confirmed with cross-national data, but also specified and qualified in several respects. Most importantly, we find that looking only at average effects gives a misleading picture of the significance of transparency for corruption. Just making information available will not prevent corruption if such conditions for publicity and accountability as education, media circulation and free and fair elections are weak. Furthermore, we find that transparency requirements that are implemented by the agent itself are less effective compared to non-agent controlled transparency institutions, such as a free press. One important implication of these findings is that reforms focusing on increasing transparency should be accompanied by measures for strengthening citizens' capacity to act upon the available information if we are to see positive effects on corruption.

Discusses the political upheaval that took place in Sweden after the European Court of Justice decided that the Latvian construction workers have the right to operate in Sweden against the wishes of Swedish labor unions. The seemingly technical court decision proves that the European Court of Justice is a political actor that is influenced by EU member states. A research constructed from time-series data and qualitative interviews is presented. L. Pitkaniemi