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Cet article s'intéresse aux relations entre gouvernement et marché dans les politiques de développement. Il montre que l'essor des mécanismes marchands dans la mise en œuvre de l'aide internationale est un phénomène institutionnel lié aux nouvelles stratégies d'intervention des États bailleurs du développement. Nous avançons tout d'abord l'idée que l'intégration des arènes de gouvernement et des espaces du marché a été largement encouragée par les réformes de gouvernance impulsées par les États au nom d'une meilleure efficacité de l'aide. Nous montrons ensuite que la prolifération des normes privées internationales utilisées dans les pratiques de développement renvoie, pour partie, à un processus de délégation d'autorité par lequel des États confient à des organismes privés un pouvoir d'édicter des normes, tout en conservant des moyens d'en contrôler la pleine effectivité. Au final, le marché constitue, pour les États bailleurs, une nouvelle modalité de conduite de leur politique internationale, transférant une partie de la charge de l'aide au développement aux acteurs privés, tout en leur offrant, en retour, l'ouverture de nouveaux marchés rémunérateurs.

Over the last decade, Western government agencies and international organizations have increasingly turned their attention to the issue of state 'fragility' and 'failure' in developing countries that are confronted with war, violence and extreme poverty. They have presented this issue as a major international policy challenge in the fields of security and development assistance. Policy analysts and scholars have also played an instrumental role in the dissemination and legitimization of the two concepts. This article disputes the analytical underpinning of this new research agenda. It argues that the concepts of fragile and failed states are confusing, inherently superficial and unstable policy-oriented labels. First, it elaborates five critical ideas concerning the scientific dimension of this literature. Second, it interprets the analytical framework of fragile/failed states as a reactivation of developmentalist theories, primarily driven by a Western conception of the polity. Third, it encourages the rejection of the state-centric approach to security and development in fragile contexts, and advocates combining interest in government institutions with a multidimensional, context-based and historically grounded approach to society-wide vulnerabilities.

AbstractThis paper focuses on the circulation of policy ideas within international administrations. Based upon a study of UNAIDS, the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, it shows how bureaucracies can capitalise on policy-oriented information and knowledge to strengthen their influence within their own environment. Using a policy transfer approach as its analytical framework, the paper draws particular attention to the UNAIDS Secretariat, considered as a "transfer entrepreneur". It argues that, in the 2000s, the Secretariat has demonstrated a capacity to collect, develop and disseminate policy ideas and, consequently, has gradually participated in UN policy development on AIDS. It thus suggests that the Secretariat has extended its authority within the UN system despite limited resources. In conclusion, the paper points out the need to examine policy transfer among international administrations through actors, interests and strategies, as a complement to holistic approaches.1

International audience ; This paper explores organizational dynamics that go with the design and implementation of public administration reforms within the UN system. It focuses on management reforms carried out in the UNAIDS Programme, which brings together ten UN agencies to combat the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. The paper suggests that understanding these reforms requires questioning the exposure of UN administrations to pressures emanating from their environment and, at the same time, investigating the intentions of bureaucratic entrepreneurs who promote and drive reforms within the UN system. The empirical development demonstrates that the swift incorporation of the external pressure into a reform process in the mid-2000s cannot be dissociated from the active support of some UN agencies who have had a common interest in shifting institutional arrangements inside UNAIDS to expand their bureaucratic authority. In conclusion, the paper suggests analyzing reforms within international administrations as social processes driven by both coercion and opportunities

This article explores organizational dynamics that go with the design and implementation of public administration reforms within the United Nations (UN) system. It focuses on management reforms carried out in the UNAIDS Programme, which brings together 10 UN agencies to combat the worldwide HIV/AIDS epidemic. The article suggests that understanding these reforms requires questioning the exposure of UN administrations to pressures emanating from their environment and at the same time, investigating the intentions of bureaucratic entrepreneurs who promote and drive reforms within the UN system. The empirical development demonstrates that the swift incorporation of the external pressure into a reform process in the mid‐2000s cannot be dissociated from the active support of some UN agencies who have had a common interest in shifting institutional arrangements inside UNAIDS to expand their bureaucratic authority. In conclusion, the article suggests analyzing reforms within international administrations as social processes driven by both coercion and opportunities.