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What is the effect of constitutional decree authority (CDA) on the policy-making process of a presidential regime? Despite recent efforts to answer this question, there is still much uncertainty in the literature about the extent to which decree powers may allow presidents to control the legislative process. This article argues that in a separation-of-powers system, the existence of CDA effectively enhances executives' ability to act as agenda setters. This capacity, however, is not uniform across all cases. Developing a simple spatial model of decree games, the author argues that the bargaining power of an executive to promote legal changes through decrees varies according to three interrelated factors: decree approval rules, the extent of the executive's partisan support in the legislature, and the strength of the presidential veto. These propositions are supported by a comparative analysis of the process of constitutional design and the implementation of decrees in Brazil and Argentina, two cases presenting significant variation in each of the independent variables.

Discusses constituent processes and distribution of power, focusing on the reform of presidentialism in Argentina; examines constraints that the 1994 constitutional reform placed on the existing structure of presidential powers. Summary in English p. 7.

Este ensayo presenta una revisión crítica de la llamada teoría "decisionista" de Carl Schmitt tal como fuera expuesta en sus principales trabajos políticos durante el periodo de Weimar. El autor argumenta que el decisionismo de Schmitt no es, como frecuentemente se ha afirmado, una simple variante del voluntarismo ético asociado a filosofías morales existencialistas y positivistas. Decisionismo es en cambio una particular doctrina política que sostiene que el Estado es la fuente absoluta de toda decisión legal y moral en la vida política. Desde esta perspectiva, el autor demuestra que el decisionismo de Schmitt es una doctrina puramente negativa, fundada en la negación simétrica de todos y cada uno de los valores políticos del liberalismo.

From Carl Schmitt's earliest works during the years of the Weimar Republic in Germany, he utilized the concept of decisionism io refer to a political viewpoint contrasted with romanticism or normative thought. In decisionism, legal rights depended on a political decision by the party in power, not norms. This was not to imply that norms & values were absent from political life, but rather, that they were not used as referents in decisions about option visions of the world. Schmitt's decisionism has been treated as a positivist dogma & an ethical philosophy, along the lines of existentialism. It is argued that it should not be treated as a variant of ethical relativism or ethical voluntarism. Schmitt gave the power of all moral & legal decisions in political life to the sovereign authority. In this sense, decisionism can be better characterized as a system negating all the political values supported by liberalism. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

Este ensayo presenta una revisión crítica de la llamada teoría "decisionista" de Carl Schmitt tal como fuera expuesta en sus principales trabajos políticos durante el periodo de Weimar. El autor argumenta que el decisionismo de Schmitt no es, como frecuentemente se ha afirmado, una simple variante del voluntarismo ético asociado a filosofías morales existencialistas y positivistas. Decisionismo es en cambio una particular doctrina política que sostiene que el Estado es la fuente absoluta de toda decisión legal y moral en la vida política. Desde esta perspectiva, el autor demuestra que el decisionismo de Schmitt es una doctrina puramente negativa, fundada en la negación simétrica de todos y cada uno de los valores políticos del liberalismo.

Vor dem Hintergrund der These Immanuel Kants, daß internationaler Frieden erreichbar ist durch den Bund der diesem Ziel verpflichteten Staaten, wird der Charakter zeitgenössischer Systeme kollektiver Sicherheit diskutiert. Dabei wird argumentiert, daß das gegenwärtige Konzept kollektiver Sicherheit nicht nur die Schaffung eines funktionierenden internationalen Sicherheitssystems behindert, sondern auch zu dem Ideal internationalen Friedens in Widerspruch gerät. Insofern müssen auch die Vereinten Nationen ihr Konzept kollektiver Sicherheit überprüfen. (AuD-Hng)