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Animal models of human disorders are a ubiquitous feature of contemporary biomedical research, but how is their value and role in understanding human disorders established? This article examines the dynamics of building up (and sometimes knocking down) claims about what a model can demonstrate in the field of animal behavior genetics. Drawing on long-standing analogies that describe scientific knowledge production as a process of construction, I introduce the metaphor of an 'epistemic scaffold' to illuminate how scientists create and contest claims about the utility of animal models. The flexible, temporary nature of scaffolding draws attention to the processes of building up claims to increasingly risky heights and reconfiguring the evidence supporting particular models by including or excluding particular facts and claims. As researchers include or exclude observations from epistemic scaffolds, to contest or build up different links, they gradually frame human disorders. Negotiations over how much to claim about the utility of animal models also reflect larger tensions in the discipline concerning what animal studies reveal about human disorders.