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Abstract
Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement.

AbstractHans Reichenbach's position in the debate over scientific realism is remarkable. On the one hand, he endorsed the programmatic premises of logical empiricism; on the other, he explicitly employed a realist approach to conceptions such as reference, causality, and inference to the best explanation. How could that work out? It will be shown in the present paper that in Reichenbach's view scientific realism is not, as frequently assumed, opposed to logical empiricism but rather to logical positivism. A distinction without a difference? Not at all, at least for Reichenbach. As is well known, his particular—probabilistic—variant of logical empiricism was intended to circumvent what he considered the shortcomings of the Vienna Circle's verificationist (reductionist) approach to the language of science. In Experience and Prediction (1938), Reichenbach became most explicit in this regard. However, I shall argue that his position remained notoriously unstable in the end. It oscillated between a full-fledged scientific realist reading and an eminently pragmatist reading. Nevertheless, Reichenbach's contribution proved instrumental in preparing subsequent efforts at reconciling logical empiricism and scientific realism.

Literaturverz. S. 229 - 252

Frontmatter -- Vorwort -- Inhalt -- I: Kritischer Realismus -- Alois Riehl – Leben, Werk und Wirkung -- Objekt und Objektivität in Kant und Riehl -- Alois Riehl's Epistemological Argument for Realism about Things in Themselves -- Riehls Auffassung der transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe -- Alois Riehls transzendentaler Realismus -- Alois Riehl und die Frage des psychophysischen Parallelismus -- Freedom and Determinism in Alois Riehl's The Philosophical Criticism -- II: Wissenschaftlicher Realismus -- Alois Riehl and Scientific Philosophy -- Alois Riehl über Hermann von Helmholtz und die Bedeutung geometrischer Axiome -- Alois Riehl and the Principle of the Conservation of Energy -- Riehl's 'Objectivist' Account of Perception -- Kantian Externalism from Riehl to Putnam -- III: Kontexte -- Heterothesis, Antithesis und die Transzendentalphilosophie. Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen Alois Riehl und Heinrich Rickert -- Zum Einfluss von Alois Riehl auf Richard Hönigswald -- 'Realistischer Kritizismus' und 'Österreichischer Neukantianismus' -- Riehl als Neukantianer -- Riehls Geschichtsbegriff: Analyse und Kritik -- "Alle großen Dinge kommen aus der großen Leidenschaft her": Zu Alois Riehls Bild von Friedrich Nietzsche -- "Alle poetischen Ideen sind Bilder": Alois Riehl und das Problem der Form in der Kunst -- IV: Wirkungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte -- Transzendentale Systeme im Wien des 20. Jahrhunderts -- The Reception and Rejection of Alois Riehl's Philosophy in Poland: Jan Stepa and Władysław Tatarkiewicz -- Appendix -- Alois Riehl (1824–1924): Selected Archive Sources on Life and Work -- Personenregister