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UK governments have often claimed that humanitarian intervention – without the consent of the target state and if necessary without express UN Security Council authorization – is legally permissible in exceptional circumstances, a stance that is highly controversial. The UK's position is at odds with prevailing international legal doctrine, which is counterintuitive for a country that is generally committed to international law, the UN framework, and multilateralism. It is also in tension with normative developments related to human protection, such as the international 'Responsibility to Protect' principle, which established that coercive responses to human suffering must be authorized by the UN Security Council. This article explores the background to the UK's position on humanitarian intervention, and it argues that this reflects an element of continuity in the UK's foreign policy in historical perspective, as a legacy of global engagement and a sense of moral righteousness and duty. The article also considers whether the UK's position may be contributing to an evolution of the norms governing the use of force for human protection.

This article explores the response of Europe to the refugee 'crisis' since 2015 and considers if this is a reasonable test of the region's commitment to international humanitarianism and the 'Responsibility to Protect' principle (R2P). This response is explored both in terms of policy decisions and the political discourse used to frame the nature of the challenge, which weighs humanitarian obligations against the needs of 'security', 'societal cohesion' and 'burden sharing'. The article argues that the European response to the refugee crisis exposes internal contradictions and limitations in liberal humanitarianism more broadly, as well as fundamental problems with R2P even amongst those countries which champion the principle. Theoretically, the paper draws upon debates about securitisation, humanitarian norms, and liberal politics. Empirically, the paper analyses elite discourse and policy decisions within Europe, as well as UN statistical data on forced migration.

According to supporters of R2P the principle now enjoys almost universal acceptance and the remaining challenges concern operationalization and implementation. In contrast, this article argues that R2P remains controversial both as a principle and in terms of its application, and these controversies reflect broader tensions in international politics related to international order and normative authority. Diplomatic debates related to R2P suggest that rising powers are resistant to aspects of the normative 'rules of the game', and that there are fundamental disagreements regarding the relationship between human rights and international order. This can be understood as a tension between pluralist and solidarist worldviews, but also a manifestation of friction regarding control of international institutions and decision-making. Although R2P is defined narrowly, therefore, this article argues that the controversies surrounding the principle must be understood within a wider political context. In conclusion, the article offers a number of suggestions as to the future of R2P based upon this analysis.

AbstractFrom a critical security studies perspective – and non-traditional security studies more broadly – is the concept of human security something which should be taken seriously? Does human security have anything significant to offer security studies? Both human security and critical security studies challenge the state-centric orthodoxy of conventional international security, based upon military defence of territory against 'external' threats. Both also challenge neorealist scholarship, and involve broadening and deepening the security agenda. Yet critical security studies have not engaged substantively with human security as a distinct approach to non-traditional security. This article explores the relationship between human security and critical security studies and considers why human security arguments – which privilege the individual as the referent of security analysis and seek to directly influence policy in this regard – have not made a significant impact in critical security studies. The article suggests a number of ways in which critical and human security studies might engage. In particular, it suggests that human security scholarship must go beyond its (mostly) uncritical conceptual underpinnings if it is to make a lasting impact upon security studies, and this might be envisioned as Critical Human Security Studies (CHSS).