Search results

Affective polarization, the strong feeling of animosity toward the supporters of the opposite party is rising in Europe. Several studies have examined the impact of ideological extremity and partisanship as a social identity on the rise of affective polarization. However, the impact of policy preferences on affective polarization remains relatively unexplored. I am at filling this gap by examining how preferences towards measures taken at addressing both the economic and the health crises impact affective polarization. Using newly collected data from Greece, a country with historically high levels of affective polarization, the analysis reveals that both policies have an impact of affective polarization but there are asymmetries on how policy preferences influence it. For the supporters of the governing conservative party, affective polarization appears to be policy-driven, whereas for the supporters of the opposition, the populist left-wing party SYRIZA, it is predominantly ideology-driven. Interestingly, the supporters of the governing party continue to align with the pro-memorandum stance even in the absence of an actual memorandum.

Late Peter Mair argued that, in the contemporary multilevel institutional setting of global governance, parties are faced with a dilemma between Responsiveness and Responsibility (RR dilemma). However, Mair did not theorize variation in how different parties experience the RR dilemma (degrees of tension) and how they manage it (strategies). We develop his work in three ways: first, we advance variants of the RR dilemma, where the tension party leaders face differs, and elucidate how viable contenders for executive office are likely to behave in each of these scenarios, and why. Second, we highlight domestic institutional factors (electoral rules and leadership autonomy) that regulate the pressure for being responsive to public opinion and to partisans. Third, we place the RR dilemma in the context of multidimensional issue competition, which helps identify strategies for managing it. Finally, we provide an empirical illustration of our arguments using data on public opinion and partisans. We show that although responsibility can be combined with (some) voters' representation, tension is high when leaders are constrained and partisans oppose responsibility even if the public endorses it; this is also the case under disproportional electoral rules when the public opposes responsibility, even if party supporters endorse it.

Late Peter Mair argued that, in the contemporary multilevel institutional setting of global governance, parties are faced with a dilemma between Responsiveness and Responsibility (RR dilemma). However, Mair did not theorize variation in how different parties experience the RR dilemma (degrees of tension) and how they manage it (strategies). We develop his work in three ways: first, we advance variants of the RR dilemma, where the tension party leaders face differs, and elucidate how viable contenders for executive office are likely to behave in each of these scenarios, and why. Second, we highlight domestic institutional factors (electoral rules and leadership autonomy) that regulate the pressure for responsiveness to public opinion and to partisans. Third, we place the RR dilemma in the context of multidimensional issue competition, which helps identify strategies for managing it. Finally, we provide an empirical illustration of our arguments using data on public opinion and partisans. We show that although responsibility can be combined with (some) voters representation, tension is high when leaders are constrained and partisans oppose responsibility even if the public endorses it; also, under disproportional electoral rules when the public opposes responsibility, even if party supporters endorse it. ; (VLID)4386872

This contribution examines the turbulent period of 2010-12 when Greece became the first European Union member state to accept the International Monetary Fund/European Union bailout package, which had significant electoral consequences. The May 2012 election was characterised by unprecedented electoral volatility and a reshuffling of the party system. An understanding of this development is sought by focusing on the relationship between government and opposition parties in terms of their MPs' legislative voting behaviour on key economic bills in the aforementioned period. It is observed that although the economic crisis seems to have decreased the importance of the traditional left-right dimension, the bailout agreements reinforced the conflict between the responsive and responsible aspects of representative government and created a new conflict dimension over supporters and opponents of the bailout agreements. This contribution concludes with a call to reassess the impact of European integration on national party systems. Adapted from the source document.

The paper examines the turbulent period of 2010-2012 when Greece became the first EU member-state to accept the IMF/EU bailout package. Unarguably, accepting the bailout package did not have only economic but also electoral consequences as the established party system has been steadily disintegrating. We focus on the relationship between government and opposition parties and MPs in the legislature and we examine their voting behaviour during key economic bills during this period. We find that their behaviour can be explained less by consensus-building and more by strategic considerations. Moreover, even though the economic crisis seems to have decreased polarization on the traditional left-right dimension, a new conflict dimension over the bailout package seems to have emerged. Taken together, these events can explain both the lack of consensus observed in other Southern European countries as well as the changes in the party system.

AbstractThe study of policy feedback on public attitudes and policy preferences has become a growing area of research in recent years. Scholars in the tradition of Pierson usually argue that positive, self-reinforcing feedback effects dominate (that is, attitudes are commensurate with existing institutions), whereas the public thermostat model developed by Wlezien and Soroka expects negative, self-undermining feedback. Moving beyond the blunt distinction between positive and negative feedback, this article develops and proposes a more fine-grained typology of feedback effects that distinguishes between accelerating, self-reinforcing and self-undermining, specific and general, as well as long- and short-term dynamic feedback. The authors apply this typology in an analysis of public opinion on government spending in different areas of the welfare state for twenty-one OECD countries, employing a pseudo-panel approach. The empirical analysis confirms the usefulness of this typology since it shows that different types of feedback effects can be observed empirically.

Public opinion research has found that increasing the investment in education is generally very popular among citizens in Western Europe. However, this evidence from publicly available opinion surveys may be misleading, because these surveys do not force respondents to prioritize between different parts of the education system or between education and other social policies, nor do they provide information about citizens' willingness to pay for additional investment in education. To address these deficiencies, we conducted an original, representative survey of public opinion on education and related policies in eight European countries. Our analysis confirms that citizens express high levels of support for education even when they are forced to choose between education and other areas of social spending. But not all educational sectors enjoy equally high levels of support: increasing spending on general schooling and vocational education is more popular than increasing spending on higher education and early childhood education. Furthermore, we find that citizens are, in fact, willing to pay additional taxes in order to finance investment in education, at least in some countries and for some sectors of the education system.