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Revenue, especially that from agricultural crops, has been considered fundamental for the development of state capacity. While existing research has mostly focused on dynamics of violence, we know less about the impact of commodities shocks on a key dimension of state power: property taxation. In this article, I explore how and why land-based coalitions—alliances between landowners and paramilitaries around the appropriation of land—undermine taxation during civil conflict. Focusing on the expansion of oil palm in Colombia and using a difference-in-differences design, I leverage the international price of oil palm and municipal variation in crop suitability. I find that, in municipalities with higher paramilitary violence and land concentration, the palm shock was associated with lower taxation, outdated cadastral information, and lower land values. This article underscores the deleterious consequences of land inequality for the state's extractive capacity even in moments of agricultural abundance.

Some politicians engage in relationships with criminal actors in pursuit of mutual interests. How does their rise to power affect state capacity? I focus on one of Colombia's worst episodes of criminal politics to understand how the victory of paramilitary-friendly mayors impacted subnational taxation. Focusing on close races, I find that the victory of a paramilitary-friendly mayor in 2007 led to a substantive drop in property taxation in subsequent years. I argue that criminal collusion allows politicians and criminals to accumulate wealth and political power, but doing so requires them to deliberately undermine local state institutions. Indeed, the evidence suggests that municipalities governed by paramilitary-friendly politicians experienced a weakening of property rights, the worsening of local judicial institutions, and an alteration of the electoral playing field. Rather than a mere consequence of criminal collusion, state weakening is a politically strategic decision that serves the interests of both criminals and politicians.

Revenue, especially that from agricultural crops, has been considered fundamental for the development of state capacity. While existing research has mostly focused on dynamics of violence, we know less about the impact of commodities shocks on a key dimension of state power: property taxation. In this article, I explore how and why land-based coalitions—alliances between landowners and paramilitaries around the appropriation of land—undermine taxation during civil conflict. Focusing on the expansion of oil palm in Colombia and using a difference-in-differences design, I leverage the international price of oil palm and municipal variation in crop suitability. I find that, in municipalities with higher paramilitary violence and land concentration, the palm shock was associated with lower taxation, outdated cadastral information, and lower land values. This article underscores the deleterious consequences of land inequality for the state's extractive capacity even in moments of agricultural abundance.

What are the subnational variations of violence against voters? This article studies the effect of land concentration on electoral violence in the context of armed conflict in Colombia. My central argument is that electoral violence tends to be higher in municipalities where landowners are a relevant social actor. More concretely, in areas where violent groups dispute territorial control, higher levels of land inequality – a proxy for landowner prominence – have a positive effect on electoral violence. However, actors do not make the simple choice between violence or no violence but may also resort to fraudulent tactics. Because electoral fraud requires greater cooperation and coordination with the state, I argue that violent groups with stronger links to state officials and political elites are more likely to engage in fraudulent tactics compared to anti-government actors. To estimate the effect of land inequality on electoral coercion and fraud, I exploit the levels of soil quality as an instrumental variable for land concentration in Colombia between 2002 and 2011. This article contributes to the literature on the politics of land inequality; elections and electoral manipulation; and the use of violence in democratic settings.

What are the subnational variations of violence against voters? This article studies the effect of land concentration on electoral violence in the context of armed conflict in Colombia. My central argument is that electoral violence tends to be higher in municipalities where landowners are a relevant social actor. More concretely, in areas where violent groups dispute territorial control, higher levels of land inequality – a proxy for landowner prominence – have a positive effect on electoral violence. However, actors do not make the simple choice between violence or no violence but may also resort to fraudulent tactics. Because electoral fraud requires greater cooperation and coordination with the state, I argue that violent groups with stronger links to state officials and political elites are more likely to engage in fraudulent tactics compared to anti-government actors. To estimate the effect of land inequality on electoral coercion and fraud, I exploit the levels of soil quality as an instrumental variable for land concentration in Colombia between 2002 and 2011. This article contributes to the literature on the politics of land inequality; elections and electoral manipulation; and the use of violence in democratic settings.

Extensive research suggests that electoral competition and power alternations increase violence in weakly institutionalized democracies. Yet, little is known about how political parties affect violence and security. We theorize that the type of party strengthened in elections shapes security outcomes and argue that the rise of programmatic parties, at the expense of clientelistic parties, can significantly reduce violence. In contexts of large-scale criminal violence, programmatic parties are less likely to establish alliances with coercive actors because they possess fewer incentives and greater coordination capacity. Focusing on Brazil, we use a regression discontinuity design that leverages the as-if random assignment of election winners across three rounds of mayoral races. We find that violent crime decreased in municipalities where programmatic parties won coin-flip elections, while it increased in those where clientelistic parties triumphed. Our findings suggest that whether electoral competition increases violence depends on the type of party that wins elections.

How do post-conflict societies contain large-scale criminal violence when state security forces that committed atrocities during a civil war remain unpunished and become key players in the criminal underworld? This article explores the impact on violence reduction of internationalized prosecution (IP): cooperation agreements between an international organization and a country's public prosecutors to dismantle state-criminal networks through judicial action. We assess the IP process by which the United Nations–sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and Guatemala's law enforcement dismantled over 70 criminal structures led by death squads and the civil war military establishment. Using synthetic control models, we estimate that Guatemala's IP process plausibly prevented the occurrence of between 20,000 and 30,000 homicides, from 2008 until 2019. Case studies show how IP contributed to violence reduction by removing criminal structures and deterring both state-criminal collusion and the state's use of iron-fist militarized policies against crime.