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Priority setting is inevitable on the path towards universal health coverage. All countries experience a gap between their population's health needs and what is economically feasible for governments to provide. Can priority setting ever be fair and ethically acceptable? Fairness requires that unmet health needs be addressed, but in a fair order. Three criteria for priority setting are widely accepted among ethicists: cost-effectiveness, priority to the worse-off, and financial risk protection. Thus, a fair health system will expand coverage for cost-effective services and give extra priority to those benefiting the worse-off, whilst at the same time providing high financial risk protection. It is considered unacceptable to treat people differently according to their gender, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, social status, or place of residence. Inequalities in health outcomes associated with such personal characteristics are therefore unfair and should be minimized. This commentary also discusses a third group of contested criteria, including rare diseases, small health benefits, age, and personal responsibility for health, subsequently rejecting them. In conclusion, countries need to agree on criteria and establish transparent and fair priority setting processes. ; publishedVersion

This article discusses what ethicists have called "unacceptable trade-offs" in health policy choices related to universal health coverage (UHC). Since the fiscal space is constrained, trade-offs need to be made. But some trade-offs are unacceptable on the path to universal coverage. Unacceptable choices include, among other examples from low-income countries, to expand coverage for services with lower priority such as coronary bypass surgery before securing universal coverage for high-priority services such as skilled birth attendance and services for easily preventable or treatable fatal childhood diseases. Services of the latter kind include oral rehydration therapy for children with diarrhea and antibiotics for children with pneumonia. The article explains why such trade-offs are unfair and unacceptable even if political considerations may push in the opposite direction.

OBJECTIVE: To explore stakeholders' acceptance of criteria for setting priorities for the health care system in Uganda. METHODS: A self-administered questionnaire was used. It was distributed to health workers, planners and administrators working in all levels of the Ugandan health care system. It was also distributed to members of the public. Participants were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with 18 criteria that could be used to set priorities for allocating health care. A total of 408 people took part. Data were entered and analysed using SPSS statistical software. Predetermined cut-off points were used to rank the criteria into three different categories: high weight (>66% of respondents agreed), average weight (33-66% of respondents agreed) and low weight (<33% of respondents agreed). We also tested for associations between respondents' characteristics and their degree of agreement with the criteria. FINDINGS: High-weight criteria included severity of disease, benefit of the intervention, cost of the intervention, cost-effectiveness of the intervention, quality of the data on effectiveness, the patients age, place of residence, lifestyle, importance of providing equity of access to health care and the community's views. The average-weight criteria included the patient's social status, mental features, physical capabilities, political views, responsibilities for others and gender. Low-weight criteria included the patient's religion, and power and influence. There were few associations between respondents' characteristics and their preferences. CONCLUSION: There was a high degree of acceptance for commonly used disease-related and society-related criteria. There was less agreement about the patient-related criteria. We propose that average-weight criteria should be debated in Uganda and other countries facing the challenge of distributing scarce health care resources.

The objective of this paper is to explore stakeholders' acceptance of criteria for setting priorities for the health care system in Uganda. A self-administered questionnaire was used. It was distributed to health workers, planners and administrators working in all levels of the Ugandan health care system. It was also distributed to members of the public. Participants were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with 18 criteria that could be used to set priorities for allocating health care. A total of 408 people took part. (InWent/DÜI)

"Prioritarianism is a framework for ethical assessment that gives extra weight to the worse off. Unlike utilitarianism, which simply adds up well-being numbers, prioritarianism is sensitive to the distribution of well-being across the population of ethical concern. Prioritarianism in Practice examines the use of prioritarianism as a policy-evaluation methodology-across a range of policy domains, including taxation, health policy, risk regulation, climate change, education, and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic-and as an indicator of a society's condition (as contrasted with GDP). This chapter is an introductory chapter to the Prioritarianism in Practice volume. It surveys the intellectual roots of prioritarianism: in the philosophical literature, in welfare economics, and in scholarship about public health. And it provides brief summaries of each of the volume's chapters. This chapter provides theoretical foundations for the Prioritarianism in Practice volume, by clarifying the features of prioritarian social welfare functions (SWFs). A prioritarian SWF sums up individuals' well-being numbers plugged into a strictly increasing and strictly increasing transformation function. Prioritarian SWFs, like the utilitarian SWF, fall within the "generalized utilitarian" class of SWFs. Generalized-utilitarian SWFs are additive and, hence, especially tractable for purposes of policy analysis. The chapter reviews the axiomatic properties of generalized utilitarian SWFs and, specifically, of prioritarian SWFs. Prioritarianism satisfies the Pigou-Dalton axiom (a pure, gap-diminishing transfer of well-being from a better-off to a worse-off person is an ethical improvement), while utilitarianism does not. Pigou-Dalton is the axiomatic expression of the fact that a prioritarian SWF gives extra weight (priority) to well-being changes affecting worse-off individuals. The chapter also discusses the informational requirements of prioritarian SWFs (as regards interpersonal well-being comparisons). It reviews the various methodologies for applying a prioritarian SWF under uncertainty. And it describes the two main subfamilies of prioritarian SWFs, namely Atkinson and Kolm-Pollak SWFs"--

Health systems communicate and enforce norms relating to equality in many ways, including the ways in which priorities are set at micro and macro levels of decision making. This article examines three common forms of priority setting and how rights-based conceptions of equality may influence them. The relevance of human rights to these processes has grown especially urgent due to the increasing attention that the World Health Organization is placing upon achieving universal health coverage and due to discussion of the post 2015 development agenda.

Although Costa Rica has no explicit constitutional right to health, its constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court (Sala IV) has become increasingly central to the resolution of many health care decisions. Some argue that courts' decisions about individuals' access to very expensive medications could upset the country's medical priorities and harm the state's general health care provision capacity. This article assesses whether health rights litigation concerning the right to medications leads to more fairness in access to medications in Costa Rica. We review randomly selected access to medicines cases successfully claimed at the Sala IV in 2008 and classify them into four priority groups using standard priority-setting criteria. We find that 2.7% of the successful cases fall into priority group I (highest priority), 27% in group II, 48.6% in group III, and 21.6% in group IV (experimental treatment). Our analysis reveals a majority of successful health rights litigation for medications results in court-mandated provision of new, expensive drugs, many with only marginal benefits. More than 70% of the successful cases evaluated concerned medications judged to be of low priority. Based on these cases, we cannot conclude that litigation leads to more fairness in access to medications. Adapted from the source document.

Background: Multiple principles are relevant in priority setting, two of which are often considered particularly important. According to the greater benefit principle, resources should be directed toward the intervention with the greater health benefit. This principle is intimately linked to the goal of health maximization and standard cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). According to the worse off principle, resources should be directed toward the intervention benefiting those initially worse off. This principle is often linked to an idea of equity. Together, the two principles accord with prioritarianism; a view which can motivate non-standard CEA. Crucial for the actual application of prioritarianism is the trade-off between the two principles, and this trade-off has received scant attention when the worse off are specified in terms of lifetime health. This paper sheds light on that specific trade-off and on the public support for prioritarianism by providing fresh empirical evidence and by clarifying the close links between the findings and normative theory. Methods: A new, self-administered, computer-based questionnaire was used, to which 96 students in Norway responded. How respondents wanted to balance quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained against benefiting those with few lifetime QALYs was quantified for a range of different cases. Results: Respondents supported both principles and were willing to make trade-offs in a particular way. In the baseline case, the median response valued a QALY 3.3 and 2.5 times more when benefiting someone with lifetime QALYs of 10 and 25 rather than 70. Average responses harbored fundamental disagreements and varied modestly across distributional settings. Conclusion: In the specific context of lifetime health, the findings underscore the insufficiency of pure QALY maximization and explicate how people make trade-offs in a way that can help operationalize lifetime prioritarianism and non-standard CEA. Seen through the lens of normative theory, the findings highlight key challenges for prioritarianism applied to priority setting. ; publishedVersion