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How do international organisations change? Many organisations expand into new areas or abandon programmes of work. This book argues that they do so not only at the collective direction of member states. Advocacy is a crucial but overlooked source of change in international organisations. Different actors can advocate for change: national diplomats, international bureaucrats, external experts, or civil society activists. They can use one of three advocacy strategies: social pressure, persuasion, and 'authority talk'. The success of each strategy depends on the presence of favourable conditions related to characteristics of advocates, targets, issues, and context. Institutionalization of new issues in international organisations as a multi-stage process, often accompanied by contestation.

In response to Toal's article "The Territorial Taboo: Explaining the Public Aversion to Negotiations in the Ukraine War Support Coalition", I argue that the alleged silencing of those who push for Ukraine's territorial concessions to Russia is an exaggerated problem. The reason why such voices are not gaining traction is because, as of summer 2024, neither Ukraine nor key European states had a majority in favor of territorial concessions. This is reassuring: it means that there is little appetite for endorsing Russian colonialism and abandoning Ukrainians on the occupied territories to Russian terror in the hope of an illusory "peace". In contrast to the majority opinion, Toal calls for sacrificing (a part of) Ukraine in order to freeze the conflict and reduce great power tensions. To make such a colonial proposition seem palatable, Toal tries to shift the blame for the continuation of the war from Russia, the aggressor, to Ukraine, the victim. In reality, Ukrainians want peace, just not on Russia's terms. Any settlement that does not involve the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity is unjust and likely unsustainable. It would give Russia an opportunity to re-arm, extracting resources from the newly occupied Ukrainian territories. Russian officials showed no intention of abiding by any potential agreements with Ukraine, reiterating their goal of destroying the Ukrainian nation and state. Since aggression against Ukraine did not attract widespread opposition within Russia and garnered quite a few enthusiastic supporters, a change in Russian policy seemed improbable as of summer 2024. The continuation of armed resistance against the Russian invasion is Ukraine's only choice.

The UN Secretariat's role in the expansion of peacekeeping after the cold war is debated. Different theoretical accounts offer competing interpretations: principal–agent models and sociological institutionalism tend to emphasize the Secretariat's risk-averse behaviour; organizational learning scholarship and international political sociology find evidence of the Secretariat's activism; constructivism analyses instances of both. I argue that the UN Secretariat can be both enthusiastic and cautious about new tasks depending on the circumstances and the issue area. For example, UN officials have been the driving force behind the development of public information campaigns by peacekeeping missions aimed at the local population. During the cold war, it was not regarded as necessary for UN missions to communicate with the public in the area of operation: their interlocutors were parties to the conflict and the diplomatic community. With the deployment of the first multidimensional missions in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, UN staff realized the need to explain the organization's role to the local population and provide information about UN-supported elections. In promoting this innovation, they played the role of policy entrepreneurs. The institutionalization of this innovation, however, was not an automatic process and required continuous advocacy by UN information staff.