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This paper considers the threats that various kinds of populism might be said to pose to the ideal of a civil society that mediates between 'private' and family life and the state. Although it is difficult to generalise about populisms, just about all – whether on left or right – share a hostility to 'intermediate' powers. Of course civil society is exactly what could be called a forum for intermediate powers. In contrast, populists often tend to emphasize a vision of immediate power in the sense of the possibility of the direct expression of the people's will in political institutions. Populists, of whatever pitch, often tend to invoke a partisan state that will be on the side of the people (however defined) rather than a putatively neutral 'liberal' state that stands over and against civil society. These factors make most populisms more or less generically hostile to liberalism, understood not in ideological terms but more as a doctrine which emphasises the necessity of mediating power through institutions. Very often, populism is a threat to the idea of civil society understood as a concept integral to liberal political theory, as a means of balancing the state and its wider interlocutors. In this paper, various means, largely inspired by the writings of Tocqueville on the one hand and Paul Hirst on the other, are suggested for addressing aspects of this predicament.

AbstractThis paper considers the threats that various kinds of populism might be said to pose to the ideal of a civil society that mediates between 'private' and family life and the state. Although it is difficult to generalise about populisms, just about all—whether on left or right—share a hostility to 'intermediate' powers. Of course civil society is exactly what could be called a forum for intermediate powers. In contrast, populists often tend to emphasise a vision of immediate power in the sense of the possibility of the direct expression of the people's will in political institutions. Populists, of whatever pitch, often tend to invoke a partisan state that will be on the side of the people (however defined) rather than a putatively neutral 'liberal' state that stands over and against civil society. These factors make most populisms more or less generically hostile to liberalism, understood not in ideological terms but more as a doctrine which emphasises the necessity of mediating power through institutions. Very often, populism is a threat to the idea of civil society understood as a concept integral to liberal political theory, as a means of balancing the state and its wider interlocutors. In this paper, various means, largely inspired by the writings of Tocqueville on the one hand and Paul Hirst on the other, are suggested for addressing aspects of this predicament.

This article revisits the long-standing question of the relations between ethics and politics in Machiavelli's work, assessing its relevance to the 'liberalism of fear' in particular in the work of Judith Shklar, Bernard Williams and also John Dunn. The article considers ways in which Machiavelli has been a 'negative' resource for liberalism – for instance, as a presumed proponent of tyranny; but also ways in which even for the liberalism of fear he might be considered a 'positive' resource, above all around the issues of political necessity and prudential judgement.

Abstract
Alasdair MacIntyre's criticism of contemporary politics rests in large part on the way in which the political communities of advanced modernity do not recognize common goals and practices. I shall argue that although MacIntyre explicitly recognizes the influence of Jacques Maritain on his own thought, MacIntyre's own views are incompatible not only with Maritain's attempt to develop a Thomistic theory which is compatible with liberal democracy, but also relies on a view of the individual as a part which is related to the whole in a way that is incompatible with Maritain's understanding of the spiritual individual or person.