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The democratic and territorial peace arguments explain interstate peace via distinct mechanisms. Yet they can be integrated. I theoretically derive both the unique domains in which each argument might operate and the ways in which the two arguments might reinforce one another. An analysis of the period 1816–2001 demonstrates support for a more integrative approach. Within contiguous dyads, border settlement significantly reduces conflict, even for non-democratic dyads. Democratic dyads, however, experience no such effect in the absence of border settlement. Nonetheless, the democratic peace functions strongly in non-contiguous dyads, and even the most peaceful, contiguous dyads require both democracy and border settlement. Such findings offer a foundation for further theoretical development that integrates the two arguments.

"The Steps to War: Theory and Evidence" published on by Oxford University Press.

The democratic and territorial peace arguments explain interstate peace via distinct mechanisms. Yet they can be integrated. I theoretically derive both the unique domains in which each argument might operate and the ways in which the two arguments might reinforce one another. An analysis of the period 1816–2001 demonstrates support for a more integrative approach. Within contiguous dyads, border settlement significantly reduces conflict, even for non-democratic dyads. Democratic dyads, however, experience no such effect in the absence of border settlement. Nonetheless, the democratic peace functions strongly in non-contiguous dyads, and even the most peaceful, contiguous dyads require both democracy and border settlement. Such findings offer a foundation for further theoretical development that integrates the two arguments.

Is predicting the international community's cumulative response to an interstate dispute possible? Can we predict what form conflict management will take and how it will evolve over the course of a dispute? I employ the concept of a conflict management trajectory to test a forecasting model of conflict management. This model accurately predicts conflict management behavior and uncovers numerous novel insights—including that the initial intervention indicates clearly the resources the international community is willing to spend on managing the dispute. These results confirm the need to theorize further about conflict management interdependence and offer clear advice to the policy community.

Can states usher in more peaceful relations with their neighbors by signing agreements that delineate their territorial boundaries? Theory suggests such a possibility, but the empirical evidence to date remains limited by research design and variable measurement decisions. After assembling a new data set on international boundary agreements, the current study conducts the first thorough test of this question during the period 1816-2001. The findings indicate that once neighboring states settle their borders, they are less likely to go to war or experience militarized interstate disputes with one another. These pacific effects persist across numerous time periods even after controlling for joint democracy, a characteristic that both theory and this analysis show to be positively related to settled borders. Through these findings, the study suggests that signing international boundary agreements can bring neighbors a more peaceful relationship with one another, regardless of the characteristics of their respective governmental regimes. Adapted from the source document.

Why don't democracies fight each other? Since discovering this empirical regularity, scholars have assumed that the answer must lie with regime type (i.e. democracy). Our paper provides and tests an alternative explanation: the territorial explanation of war, which stresses grievances and argues that territorial issues incentivize states to resort to war more often than disagreements over other, non-territorial issues. We show that democracies do not generally have territorial militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) or the territorial claims that would produce territorial MIDs. Democracies are peaceful because they lack the most dangerous grievances in the international system.

The democratic peace program arguably constitutes one of the most successful empirical research programs in the discipline. Its main empirical finding motivated extensive theorizing (e.g., challengers, as well as distinct theoretical enterprises), sparked further debate about how to conceptualize and operationalize democracy, and shifted the foreign policy discourse, particularly in the United States. Lost in these successes, however, is a critical unanswered question: how much interstate peace can the democratic peace potentially explain? We explore these limits (i.e., scope, or empirical coverage) in this study. We first identify the peaceful dyadic relationships—namely those that never go to war across long historical periods. We next classify these dyads as democratic (i.e., both members are democracies) or nondemocratic. The empirical analysis then examines this democracy–peace relationship across three time periods, three distinct samples (which address potential false positives), two definitions of "peace," and two thresholds for democracy. Regardless of how we approach the data, only 4–26 percent of all peaceful dyads qualify as "democratic." Because we control for the obvious trivial explanation (insufficient capabilities due to distance), some other (set of) factor(s) must account for the majority of interstate peace. We close with a discussion about where future research might search for these factors, as well as the larger policy implications of the study.

AbstractThe democratic peace program arguably constitutes one of the most successful empirical research programs in the discipline. Its main empirical finding motivated extensive theorizing (e.g., challengers, as well as distinct theoretical enterprises), sparked further debate about how to conceptualize and operationalize democracy, and shifted the foreign policy discourse, particularly in the United States. Lost in these successes, however, is a critical unanswered question: how much interstate peace can the democratic peace potentially explain? We explore these limits (i.e., scope, or empirical coverage) in this study. We first identify the peaceful dyadic relationships—namely those that never go to war across long historical periods. We next classify these dyads as democratic (i.e., both members are democracies) or nondemocratic. The empirical analysis then examines this democracy–peace relationship across three time periods, three distinct samples (which address potential false positives), two definitions of "peace," and two thresholds for democracy. Regardless of how we approach the data, only 4–26 percent of all peaceful dyads qualify as "democratic." Because we control for the obvious trivial explanation (insufficient capabilities due to distance), some other (set of) factor(s) must account for the majority of interstate peace. We close with a discussion about where future research might search for these factors, as well as the larger policy implications of the study.

Many dyads develop peaceful relationships, avoiding war for long, historical periods. Are such dyads common? How many exist, and why have they never fought? This study provides a territorial perspective on peaceful dyads, defined as those that never fight a war over a given historical period. It compares two explanations for why peaceful dyads exist: the territorial peace and the democratic peace. A series of hypotheses test the relative ability of these two theories to account for peaceful dyads. The tests employ three samples – all dyads, politically relevant dyads, and grievance dyads – from 1816–2001, with an emphasis on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Through our analyses, we produce three major findings. First, the absence of territorial conflict – but not democracy – predicts peaceful dyads. Second, the absence of territorial disagreements appears in the vast majority (i.e., 85–96%) of peaceful dyads. Finally, approximately, 93–98% of democratic dyads lack any territorial disagreements. This implies that democratic dyads are peaceful because they face different issues than non-democratic dyads – ones less likely to undermine the development of peaceful, dyadic relationships.

Do democratic dyads handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads, or have they cleared the most contentious issues (that is, unsettled borders) off their foreign policy agenda before becoming democratic? This study compares the conflicting answers of the democratic peace and the territorial peace and examines the empirical record to see which is more accurate. It finds that almost all contiguous dyads settle their borders before they become joint democracies. Furthermore, the majority of non-contiguous dyad members also settle their borders with all neighboring states before their non-contiguous dyad becomes jointly democratic. Such findings are consistent with the theoretical expectations of the territorial peace, rather than the democratic peace. They also weaken a core argument of the democratic peace, for this analysis finds that one reason democratic dyads may handle their disputes more peacefully than non-democratic dyads is not because of their institutions or norms, but rather because they have dispensed with the disputes most likely to involve the use of military force prior to becoming democratic.