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"This book examines the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the context of the global economy in the twenty-first century, arguing that many problems within the institution lie in the disparity between its design and the nature of its tasks. Studying the global trade regime and the unsuccessful Doha round of trade liberalization negotiations, this volume suggests that important institutional adjustments may be necessary for the WTO and other major international institutions to (re-)gain their ability to manage global economy. It uses extensive new qualitative and quantitative evidence to identify systematic dysfunctions in how the Doha negotiations have been conducted and links these dysfunctions to the exclusively inter-governmental design of interest representation in the WTO. Based on this, the book argues that global economic institutions should consider allowing broader parliamentary and non-state representation of their members. Presenting findings which can also be applied to other global economic institutions, Negotiations in the World Trade Organization will be useful to students and scholars of international trade, global governance and international political economy"--

AbstractThis paper presents the first theoretical and large-scale empirical account of the visibility of major global international organizations (IOs) in news media around the world. It focuses on the everyday, continuous coverage of IOs, through which knowledge and support of IOs can be built over time. Synthesizing insights from Media Studies and International Relations (IR), I develop a theoretical framework centered on the tangibility of IOs' work—its concreteness and proximity to audiences—as the key driver of variation in IOs' media visibility across states. Empirically, I study the media visibility of the 40 IOs and IO bodies that form the UN System broadly defined, including virtually all the major formal global IOs. I find that the IOs are systematically more visible in states where they conduct tangible development-focused operational activity. The differences are sizeable: IO media visibility in states with the lowest levels of human development is approximately 75% higher than in highest-development level states, typically Western. The empirical analysis is based on a novel dataset of more than 3.4 million news articles in 63 languages and 135 states, accounting for 96% of the world population, spanning 2018–2021. Natural language processing-based analysis is complemented with human coding of the content of a sample of articles, further highlighting the importance of the development-focused operational activity of IOs for their media visibility. The findings have important implications for our understanding of the public image of IOs in Western states and beyond.

This article presents a theoretical and descriptive account of the worldwide media visibility of NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations in connection to the Russia-Ukraine war. I formulate a theoretical framework that highlights the authority of the three international organizations (IOs) and their actions as the drivers of their media visibility. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that maps, using natural language processing tools, the content of more than 2.9 million news articles published in January-September 2022 across virtually all states of the world and 60 languages. The empirical results show that NATO's initial media visibility was high but has decreased significantly over time, the EU has maintained a persistently strong media visibility throughout the period, and the visibility of the UN has been characterized by dynamic developments. These findings have important implications for the public image and the role of the three IOs in the war.

The Doha round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) constitutes one of the prime cases of current multilateral negotiations. But in the more than twelve years of the negotiations, little progress has been achieved. 'Given this, I ask whether there is at all any zone of possible agreement in the Doha round. To answer the question, I present a large new dataset on the negotiation positions of the almost fifty largest WTO members. The dataset is based on a manual coding of the statements by the member states' ministers at the ministerial conferences in the years 1996-2011. After the aggregation and quantification of these data, a game-theoretical analysis is performed on them. On the basis of this analysis, I find a relatively large zone of agreement among the states and the Nash bargaining solution of their negotiations. Adapted from the source document.

My target in the present text is to discuss the possibilities and pitfalls of the study of international institutions' design. To achieve this goal I critically review the existing literature on the topic and outline three key reasons for which I believe much of the work on institutional design to be theoretically problematic, and for which any meaningful progress of the study of design as a research programme is unlikely. I argue that we can overcome these problems by returning and sticking to the original concept of institutions as mechanisms for transmission of information that was formulated in the institutional theory in international relations. On the basis of this concept we can develop a research programme on institutional design that takes seriously the basic realist findings about the power nature of international politics. Besides this, by focusing on the information transmission function of institutions we open the space for application of the potentially highly relevant findings from the area of the so-called organizational cybernetics to the study of international relations. With their help new methods for diagnosis of the institutions' functions can be developed and important new empirical and theoretical findings can be achieved. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of this article is to outline important developments in the European Union decision-making after the eastern enlargement and to draw attention to their likely implications, especially to the threats they may pose to the functioning and democratic quality of the European polity. Starting with an observation of the trend of the informalization of the European political process, I outline a theoretical argument about the likely emergence of structural divisions among the member states in the Council of Ministers. On the basis of a simple spatial model I show that the informalization of the political process can be expected to lead to important changes in the Commission-Council interaction and, by implication, to the emergence of a stable group of MSs within the Council with a privileged access to the Commission in the long term. I illustrate the validity of the argument with the use of a computer simulation. The article does not present new empirical data; instead it attempts to provide an explanation for certain empirical patterns identified in recent literature and shed light on the strategic incentives of actors in the European decision-making process. . Adapted from source document.

This paper aims to develop a simple, rigorous, and generally applicable analytical framework for investigation of the ability of international institutions to shape the political contestation among actors in international politics. To achieve this end, it discusses the key conceptual problems of the existing notions of the functioning of international institutions and offers steps to address these problems. It partially reformulates and formalizes the currently used concepts of effectiveness and robustness of institutions and builds upon them the concept of institutional capacity, which captures the quality of the institutions' work in a more complex and analytically rigorous manner. Subsequently, the paper discusses how the concept of institutional capacity can be applied to the study of the political systems of international organizations and presents a list of 24 criteria that are suitable for assessments of their functioning. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of "contested multilateralism" (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

This paper analyzes how patterns of international cooperation are affected if a group of states, led by a major power, pursues a strategy of "contested multilateralism" (CM). We conceptualize CM as a reaction to deadlock in institutional adjustment bargaining where CM lowers the gains actors can reap from cooperation in the short run. We demonstrate that, in the long run, CM nevertheless can have positive effects on international cooperation and specify when this is the case. Because of the costs associated with it, CM conveys a credible signal of the resolve of a dissatisfied group of states to contest the institutional status quo. Due to this capacity, CM alters the institutional and strategic environment within which institutional adjustment bargaining takes place. As a result, CM opens up the possibility for inter-institutional accommodation that increases realized cooperation gains. We probe the plausibility of our theoretical reasoning with empirical case studies on competitive regime creation in multilateral development finance and on regime-shifting in the governance of international trade in genetically modified organisms.

How successful have emerging powers been at increasing their representation within the secretariats of international organizations (IOs)? We examine the representation of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN) System, including the UN Secretariat, over the last two decades. The analysis reveals four major findings. First, some redistribution of staff positions from established to emerging powers has taken place, but it has been relatively minor. Second, nationals from emerging powers are still strongly under-represented in international secretariats in comparison with those from established powers. Third, emerging powers' representation at the IMF and WTO increased more than in the UN, where it actually declined. Fourth, there is strong variation between emerging powers: India appears to be the most successful emerging power in sending its nationals to the secretariats of IOs, Brazil's and China's records are mixed, and Russia has fared poorly. We interpret our findings in light of international relations theories and theories of institutional path dependence. The results suggest that staffing patterns are only loosely related to shifts in economic size and are subject to strong independent institutional dynamics.

Although international organizations (IOs) and their secretariats play important roles in international politics, we know surprisingly little about their staffing composition and the factors that shape it. What accounts for the national composition of the secretariats of IOs? We theorize that the national composition of international secretariats is shaped by three factors: the desire by powerful states for institutional control, a commonly shared interest in a secretariat's functional effectiveness, and, increasingly, a need for secretariats to be seen as legitimate by being representative of the global population. Building on recent constructivist literature, we argue that IOs face increasing normative pressure to be representative in their staffing patterns. Using panel regression, we assess our argument with a new dataset covering states' representation in the secretariats of thirty-five United Nations system bodies from 1997 to 2015. The results indicate that while functional effectiveness plays a significant and stable role, international secretariats have become increasingly representative of the global population. Moreover, this has come primarily at the expense of the over-representation of powerful states. This shift from power to representation is particularly strong in large IOs with high political and societal visibility. When it comes to IO secretariats, representativeness (increasingly) matters. ; Si bien las organizaciones internacionales (OI) y sus secretarías desempeñan un papel importante en la política internacional, sabemos increíblemente poco acerca de cómo se compone su personal y los factores que lo configuran. ¿Cómo se explica la composición nacional de las secretarías de las OI? Planteamos que la composición nacional de las secretarías internacionales está determinada por tres factores: el deseo de control de los estados poderosos; un interés común en la eficacia funcional de una secretaría; y, cada vez más, la necesidad de que las secretarías se consideren legítimas por ser representativas de la población mundial. Basándonos en la literatura constructivista reciente, sostenemos que las OI enfrentan una presión normativa cada vez mayor para ser representativas en sus patrones de contratación de personal. Utilizando el modelo de regresión de panel, evaluamos nuestro argumento con un nuevo conjunto de datos que abarca la representación de los estados en las secretarías de 35 órganos del sistema de las Naciones Unidas entre 1997 y 2015. Los resultados indican que, si bien la eficacia funcional juega un papel importante y estable, las secretarías internacionales se han vuelto cada vez más representativas de la población mundial. Además, esto se ha producido principalmente a expensas de la sobrerrepresentación de los estados poderosos. Este cambio del poder a la representación es particularmente fuerte en las OI grandes con alta visibilidad política y social. Cuando se trata de secretarías de OI, la representatividad importa (cada vez más).

Although international organizations (IOs) and their secretariats play important roles in international politics, we know surprisingly little about their staffing composition and the factors that shape it. What accounts for the national composition of the secretariats of IOs? We theorize that the national composition of international secretariats is shaped by three factors: the desire by powerful states for institutional control, a commonly shared interest in a secretariat's functional effectiveness, and, increasingly, a need for secretariats to be seen as legitimate by being representative of the global population. Building on recent constructivist literature, we argue that IOs face increasing normative pressure to be representative in their staffing patterns. Using panel regression, we assess our argument with a new dataset covering states' representation in the secretariats of thirty-five United Nations system bodies from 1997 to 2015. The results indicate that while functional effectiveness plays a significant and stable role, international secretariats have become increasingly representative of the global population. Moreover, this has come primarily at the expense of the over-representation of powerful states. This shift from power to representation is particularly strong in large IOs with high political and societal visibility. When it comes to IO secretariats, representativeness (increasingly) matters.