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Unatoč neupitnoj povezanosti stavova i ponašanja, velik broj teoretičara slaže se da stavove o političkom nasilju i sudjelovanje u političkom nasilju ne treba izjednačavati. Ipak, ranija istraživanja nisu se eksplicitno bavila empirijskom provjerom valjanosti tog izjednačavanja u kontekstu radikalizacije. Stoga je cilj ovog rada bio provjeriti koliko je precizno moguće temeljem stavova o političkom nasilju razlikovati sudionike političkog nasilja od osoba koje u političkom nasilju ne sudjeluju. Analize su provedene na skupu podataka prikupljenom u sklopu projekta MyPLACE krajem 2012. i početkom 2013. na mladima (N = 16935) iz četrnaest europskih država, uključujući Hrvatsku. Nakon uparivanja sudionika s ciljem eliminacije potencijalnih izvora pristranosti u procjenama, rezultati su potvrdili da obje mjere stava o političkom nasilju – opravdavanje političkog nasilja i percipirana efikasnost političkog nasilja – pružaju značajan i neovisan doprinos objašnjavanju varijance sudjelovanja u političkom nasilju. Međutim, temeljem spomenutih varijabli oko trećine sudionika bilo je pogrešno klasificirano glede stvarnog sudjelovanja u političkom nasilju, čime je i empirijski potvrđena važnost zasebnog istraživanja kognitivne i bihevioralne radikalizacije, kao i opravdanost razlikovanja između stavova i ponašanja u kontekstu političkog nasilja.

Although many different models of radicalization integrate different intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intergroup processes, this interactive approach is scarcely present in the empirical studies. The goal of this study was to fill this gap by combining personality traits (Machiavellianism), ideology (Islamism), and outcomes of intergroup comparisons (perceived deprivations) as predictors of support for Daesh among Muslims in the MENA region, based on Arab Barometer IV data. Results were calculated on the overall sample and on synthetically balanced samples from Algeria and Palestine, respectively, to ensure the robustness of findings. While Islamists were generally supportive of Daesh, socio-politically deprived individuals were not. A negative relationship between Machiavellianism and support for Daesh was found only in Algeria. Multiple interactions, which differed in Algeria and Palestine, confirm the relevance of studying complex relationships among potential predictors of extremism, as well as the role of context that can strengthen or diminish these relationships.

Outcomes of a recent meta-analysis highlighted the difference in the contribution of egoistic and fraternalistic relative deprivation to the prediction of support for political violence and violent intentions. However, no explanation for this difference was provided. As processual models of aggression contain the "targeting" phase, in which responsibility for the situation is attributed to someone or something, next to testing the relationship between the two types of relative deprivation and support for political violence and violent intentions (intentions to participate in activities of a violent group) as criteria, we also tested if the degree of blame for inequality attributed to the outgroup moderates these relationships. The analysis was conducted on Croatian student (n = 735) and non-student (n = 144) samples of youth. Fraternalistic relative deprivation consistently exhibited stronger relationships with our criteria than egoistic relative deprivation, which predicted only the support for political violence. Despite the shared variance, we also found arguments in favor of the interaction between fraternalistic relative deprivation and blame attribution in the prediction of violent intentions, but not in the prediction of support for political violence. Altogether, the findings confirm the contribution of fraternalistic relative deprivation and blame attribution to understanding attitudes and intentions behind political violence. Implications for deradicalization programs are briefly discussed.

With much unknown about the new coronavirus, the scientific consensus is that human hosts are crucial to its spread and reproduction—the more people behave like regular socializing beings they are, the more likely it is that the virus will propagate. Hence, many nations worldwide have mandated physical-distancing measures. In the current preregistered research, we focus on examining two factors that may help explain differences in adherence to COVID-19 preventive behaviors and policy support across different countries—political orientation and analytic thinking. We positioned our research within the dual-process framework of human reasoning and investigated the role of cognitive reflection, open-minded thinking, and political ideology in determining COVID-19 responsible behavior (physical distancing and maintaining hygiene) and support for restrictive COVID-19 policies on a sample of 12,490 participants from 17 countries. We have not been able to detect substantial relationships of political orientation with preventive behaviors and policy support, and overall found no reliable evidence of politicization, nor polarization regarding the issue. The results of structural equation modeling showed that the inclination towards COVID-19 preventive measures and their endorsement were defined primarily by the tendency of open-minded thinking. Specifically, open-minded thinking was shown to be a predictor of all three criteria—avoiding physical contact, maintaining physical hygiene, and supporting COVID-19 restrictive mitigation policies. Cognitive reflection was predictive of lesser adherence to stricter hygiene and only very weakly predictive of lesser policy support. Furthermore, there was no evidence of these effects varying across political contexts. The mediation analysis suggested a partial mediation effect of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs on the relationships of open-mindedness and cognitive reflection with physical distancing (but not adherence to stricter hygiene) and COVID-19 policy support, albeit very small and ...

Abstract
At the beginning of 2020, COVID-19 became a global problem. Despite all the efforts to emphasize the relevance of preventive measures, not everyone adhered to them. Thus, learning more about the characteristics determining attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic is crucial to improving future interventions. In this study, we applied machine learning on the multi-national data collected by the International Collaboration on the Social and Moral Psychology of COVID-19 (N = 51,404) to test the predictive efficacy of constructs from social, moral, cognitive, and personality psychology, as well as socio-demographic factors, in the attitudinal and behavioral responses to the pandemic. The results point to several valuable insights. Internalized moral identity provided the most consistent predictive contribution—individuals perceiving moral traits as central to their self-concept reported higher adherence to preventive measures. Similar was found for morality as cooperation, symbolized moral identity, self-control, open-mindedness, collective narcissism, while the inverse relationship was evident for the endorsement of conspiracy theories. However, we also found a non-negligible variability in the explained variance and predictive contributions with respect to macro-level factors such as the pandemic stage or cultural region. Overall, the results underscore the importance of morality-related and contextual factors in understanding adherence to public health recommendations during the pandemic.

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated selfreported factors associated with public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = −0.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.