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"While Syria has been dominated since the 1960s by a determinedly secular regime, the uprising that began there in 2011 has raised many questions about the role of Islam in the country's politics. This book, which is based on the author's extensive fieldwork in Syria's mosques and schools and on interviews with local Muslim scholars, is the first comprehensive study of the country's little-known religious scene and its most influential actors, the ulama. It demonstrates that with the eradication of the Muslim Brothers after the failed insurrection of 1982, Sunni men of religion became the only voice of the Islamic trend in the country. Through educational programs, the establishment of charitable foundations, and their deft handling of tribal and merchant networks, they took advantage of popular disaffection with secular ideologies to increase their influence over society. In recent years, with the Islamic resurgence, the Alawi-dominated Ba'thist regime was compelled to bring the clergy into the political fold. This ambiguous relationship was exposed in 2011 by the division of the Sunni clergy between regime supporters, bystanders, and opponents. This book affords an entirely new perspective on Syrian society as it stands at the crossroads of political and social fragmentation"--

In Search of Greater Syria: The History and Politics of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, by Christopher Solomon. London: I.B. Tauris, 2022. 240 pages. $120 cloth, $39.95 paper, $35.95 e-book. The Rise and Fall of Greater Syria: A Political History of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, by Carl C. Yonker. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021. 291 pages. $92.99 cloth, e-book; $21.99 paper.

International audience ; Les évolutions des quarante dernières années auront montré que la trajectoire de politisation des salafistes quiétistes répond à des considérations éminemment contextuelles et ne saurait donc être appréhendée par le seul prisme des doctrines religieuses. Les différentes expériences évoquées dans ce chapitre présentent néanmoins des points communs qui permettent d'identifier un rapport spécifique, réactif et exclusif, des salafistes quiétistes à l'engagement politique. En effet, ce dernier survient généralement en réponse à la montée en puissance de courants islamistes rivaux plutôt qu'en raison d'un intérêt pour le pouvoir en tant que tel. L'exclusivisme des salafistes se déploie donc surtout contre les autres courants islamistes et cela parce qu'ils identifient le champ religieux, plutôt que politique, comme domaine principal de la lutte. Adopter, à l'inverse, un rapport proactif et inclusif à l'engagement politique, c'est-à-dire prioriser la conquête du pouvoir par le biais d'une alliance avec d'autres forces, notamment islamistes, implique pour les groupes concernés un changement radical de logiciel qui, lorsqu'il survient, rend ténue, et donc poreuse, la frontière idéologique séparant les salafistes politisés des Frères Musulmans.

International audience ; Les évolutions des quarante dernières années auront montré que la trajectoire de politisation des salafistes quiétistes répond à des considérations éminemment contextuelles et ne saurait donc être appréhendée par le seul prisme des doctrines religieuses. Les différentes expériences évoquées dans ce chapitre présentent néanmoins des points communs qui permettent d'identifier un rapport spécifique, réactif et exclusif, des salafistes quiétistes à l'engagement politique. En effet, ce dernier survient généralement en réponse à la montée en puissance de courants islamistes rivaux plutôt qu'en raison d'un intérêt pour le pouvoir en tant que tel. L'exclusivisme des salafistes se déploie donc surtout contre les autres courants islamistes et cela parce qu'ils identifient le champ religieux, plutôt que politique, comme domaine principal de la lutte. Adopter, à l'inverse, un rapport proactif et inclusif à l'engagement politique, c'est-à-dire prioriser la conquête du pouvoir par le biais d'une alliance avec d'autres forces, notamment islamistes, implique pour les groupes concernés un changement radical de logiciel qui, lorsqu'il survient, rend ténue, et donc poreuse, la frontière idéologique séparant les salafistes politisés des Frères Musulmans.

L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.

International audience ; Les évolutions des quarante dernières années auront montré que la trajectoire de politisation des salafistes quiétistes répond à des considérations éminemment contextuelles et ne saurait donc être appréhendée par le seul prisme des doctrines religieuses. Les différentes expériences évoquées dans ce chapitre présentent néanmoins des points communs qui permettent d'identifier un rapport spécifique, réactif et exclusif, des salafistes quiétistes à l'engagement politique. En effet, ce dernier survient généralement en réponse à la montée en puissance de courants islamistes rivaux plutôt qu'en raison d'un intérêt pour le pouvoir en tant que tel. L'exclusivisme des salafistes se déploie donc surtout contre les autres courants islamistes et cela parce qu'ils identifient le champ religieux, plutôt que politique, comme domaine principal de la lutte. Adopter, à l'inverse, un rapport proactif et inclusif à l'engagement politique, c'est-à-dire prioriser la conquête du pouvoir par le biais d'une alliance avec d'autres forces, notamment islamistes, implique pour les groupes concernés un changement radical de logiciel qui, lorsqu'il survient, rend ténue, et donc poreuse, la frontière idéologique séparant les salafistes politisés des Frères Musulmans.

L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.

L'éditeur n'autorise aucune publication totale ou partielle du texte en accès ouvert. ; International audience ; In the first years of the Syrian insurgency, Turkey adopted a hands-off approach by allowing anti-Asad militants and their foreign patrons to use its territory while minimally intervening in the rebellion's internal affairs. However, as Gulf States disinvested from the Syrian conflict from 2015 onward, and as the Turkish army entered Syria in 2016, Ankara emerged as the chief patron of northern rebel factions. Turkey's management of the Syrian rebellion during that period has featured four main characteristics: first, the AKP government has frequently relied on intermediaries recruited on the basis of shared ethnicity, in particular Turkmens, or ideology, such as Muslim Brotherhood aligned factions like Faylaq al-Sham; second, whereas Gulf States privileged a network-based, clientelistic approach, Turkey has sought to unify Syrian rebels through institution-building, a strategy best illustrated by the establishment of the Syrian National Army in 2017; third, a changing strategic context has led Ankara to profoundly reshape the purpose of the Syrian rebellion, away from its anti-Assad agenda and in support of Turkey's priorities; fourth, in its relations with Jihadi groups, Turkey has displayed a risk-averse approach characterized by a combination of engagement and discreet pressures.

International audience ; Contrary to a widespread belief, Arab nationalism did not emerge in Syria as a purely secular ideology, considering that proto-Islamists played a key role in popularizing it from the late Ottoman era onward. This emphasis on Syria's Arabness was perpetuated after independence by the Muslim Brotherhood: first, out of a quest for relevance in the country's parliamentary system, notably after Nasser's popularity grew among the conservative opinion; second, because after it was banned by the Baathist regime in 1963, the Brotherhood considered that returning to Syrian politics required to remain in tune with Arab nationalist ideas, despite the fact that the latter were increasingly vilified by conservative ulama and Islamist militants in the name of Pan-Islamic unity. The 2011 revolution and ensuing conflict had ambivalent consequences in that respect: On the one hand, alignment with the popular uprising encouraged a focus on Syrianhood as opposed to transnational identities, not only on the part of the Brotherhood, but also among hardliners like Ahrar al-Sham and, more ambiguously, the formerly al-Qaeda affiliated Hay'aTahrir al-Sham; on the other hand, the Islamic State's unrepentant Pan-Islamists seized the new opportunity structure to proclaim the restoration of the Caliphate.

International audience ; Contrary to a widespread belief, Arab nationalism did not emerge in Syria as a purely secular ideology, considering that proto-Islamists played a key role in popularizing it from the late Ottoman era onward. This emphasis on Syria's Arabness was perpetuated after independence by the Muslim Brotherhood: first, out of a quest for relevance in the country's parliamentary system, notably after Nasser's popularity grew among the conservative opinion; second, because after it was banned by the Baathist regime in 1963, the Brotherhood considered that returning to Syrian politics required to remain in tune with Arab nationalist ideas, despite the fact that the latter were increasingly vilified by conservative ulama and Islamist militants in the name of Pan-Islamic unity. The 2011 revolution and ensuing conflict had ambivalent consequences in that respect: On the one hand, alignment with the popular uprising encouraged a focus on Syrianhood as opposed to transnational identities, not only on the part of the Brotherhood, but also among hardliners like Ahrar al-Sham and, more ambiguously, the formerly al-Qaeda affiliated Hay'aTahrir al-Sham; on the other hand, the Islamic State's unrepentant Pan-Islamists seized the new opportunity structure to proclaim the restoration of the Caliphate.

International audience ; Syria's modern history is a tale of continuity and upheavals at once. By 2011, the country had been ruled by the same party, the Ba'th, and the same family, the Asads, for more than four decades. Yet, this period was far from stable as the country witnessed a socialist "revolution from above", internal coups and factional struggles, multiple crackdowns against the opposition, local uprisings and a nationwide Islamist insurgency (1979-82), in addition to direct military confrontations and proxy wars with all of the country's neighbors and the United States.

International audience ; Syria's modern history is a tale of continuity and upheavals at once. By 2011, the country had been ruled by the same party, the Ba'th, and the same family, the Asads, for more than four decades. Yet, this period was far from stable as the country witnessed a socialist "revolution from above", internal coups and factional struggles, multiple crackdowns against the opposition, local uprisings and a nationwide Islamist insurgency (1979-82), in addition to direct military confrontations and proxy wars with all of the country's neighbors and the United States.