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AbstractThis article analyses the process of adaptation of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to EU membership and participation in CFSP, both before and after EU accession. It addresses changes in organizational structure, but also in institutional culture and everyday practices. Despite the initial ambiguity, Polish decision-makers tend to perceive CFSP as an opportunity rather than a constraint on national foreign policy. It is argued that the turning point of the Europeanization process took place in 2003, when Poland became an active observer to the EU and its diplomats were allowed to attend meetings inside the Council. The article also identifies and analyses the gaps in experience and knowledge between the diplomats posted to Brussels and those that stayed in Warsaw. Finally, it examines the various challenges that EU membership held for the MFA and how they have been dealt with so far.

It is a common assumption that through decades of co-operation there has been an emergence of trust between the Member States of the European Union. Yet, we have little evidence about the nature of trust and its implications for decision-making, in particular in times of crisis. Hence, our article's central question: how does trust matter in the process of decision-making during crisis? Our argument is that uncertainty during the crisis enabled trust-building between the actors: Member States and European institutions. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, this happened in parallel to the decreasing levels of trust in EU–Russia relations. Consequently, the EU was able to agree and implement the instruments of coercive power. To illustrate our argument, we look at the adoption of EU sanctions in reaction to the annexation of Crimea, the downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 plane and the war in Donbass.

AbstractIt is a common assumption that through decades of co‐operation there has been an emergence of trust between the Member States of the European Union. Yet, we have little evidence about the nature of trust and its implications for decision‐making, in particular in times of crisis. Hence, our article's central question: how does trust matter in the process of decision‐making during crisis? Our argument is that uncertainty during the crisis enabled trust‐building between the actors: Member States and European institutions. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, this happened in parallel to the decreasing levels of trust in EU–Russia relations. Consequently, the EU was able to agree and implement the instruments of coercive power. To illustrate our argument, we look at the adoption of EU sanctions in reaction to the annexation of Crimea, the downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 plane and the war in Donbass.

The article joins the discussion on the resistance to norms in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by focusing on the European External Action Service (EEAS). It begins by defining the norms that are associated with the EEAS as: (1) close cooperation by the Member States with the EEAS, (2) sharing information and (3) abstaining from influencing staff of one's own nationality and Seconded National Experts (SNEs) along one's own national interests. Then, the authors continue by analysing the types of resistance and explaining why the Member States choose to resist the norms related to the organization they had previously created with a unanimous decision. The article concludes that even if soft rules may at first seem to be less costly than hard laws, their less constraining nature does not automatically imply less resistance. All three types of instruments identified by Saurugger and Terpan in the introduction1 have been used for resistance with information and communication being the most commonly employed. Cognitive distance between the European and national level seem to have stronger explanatory value than the financial and social resources of Member States.

Abstract not available. Adapted from the source document.