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1. Introduction -- 2. EU foreign policy and conflict management -- 3. The EU's piecemeal involvement in Transnistria -- 4. The EU's reluctant engagement in Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- 5. The EU's non-involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh -- 6. Conclusions : the EU's involvement and reluctance.

`The present book provides the ultimate guide to the EU's performance in conflict management in the post-Soviet space. This is not a book written based on research in a warm office. Nicu Popescu has criss-crossed the conflict regions. The book shows in minute detail how much the EU has progressed in becoming a conflict management actor, but also how difficult and contradictory that process still is.'

Abstract:
Adrift without the ideological compass of Soviet communism, almost every political force in post-Soviet Russia has flirted at one time or another with nationalism. Russia's disputed December 2011 parliamentary elections triggered the biggest popular protests in the country of the past two decades. One of the most striking and unexpected features of these events was the partnership of liberals and nationalists in the ranks of the protesters. It is not clear how long the cooperation between these two groups will persist, but the extent to which they are able to join their efforts is likely to have a critical effect on the future of Russian politics.

Adrift without the ideological compass of Soviet communism, almost every political force in post-Soviet Russia has flirted at one time or another with nationalism. Russia's disputed December 2011 parliamentary elections triggered the biggest popular protests in the country of the past two decades. One of the most striking and unexpected features of these events was the partnership of liberals and nationalists in the ranks of the protesters. It is not clear how long the cooperation between these two groups will persist, but the extent to which they are able to join their efforts is likely to have a critical effect on the future of Russian politics. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. The article deals with the European Union (EU) policy toward the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-arabakh. The article argues that, in order to understand the EU as a crisis management actor, one has to study not just the patterns of EU intervention in conflict resolution and the impact of its actions but also EU decision not to intervene. These have a huge explanatory potential for the understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Thus the article analyses in detail not just what the EU does vis-à-vis the post-Soviet secessionist conflicts but also what it failed to do. It analyses EU decisions to appoint special envoys, send civilian crisis management operations and offer assistance to the conflict zones, but also draws lessons from EU's refusal to consider the deployment of peacekeepers or the avoidance of conflict resolution strategies, which might upset Russia. The article concludes that EU intervention in conflict resolution is primarily driven by external constraints or opportunities rather than strategic design. When faced with a choice for possible intervention in conflict settlement, the EU tends to opt for the easier, rather than the necessary, foreign policy measures and tends to work around the hard issues of conflict resolution.