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The language of politics, the medium of ideological presentation of the idea of relations inside a given community is an area of discourse struggle. This means that apart from the offered meanings, there are also attempts to hide the competitive or unassimilable message in it. Thus, taboo is its inseparable element. Today's public discourse is full of meta-language remarks in which the word taboo appears explicitly or is semantically present in the form of allusions to all sorts of forbidden themes. Through the analysis of contexts in which a word appears in the corpus of public speeches, the paper attempts to prove that, along with the criticism of Newspeak and political correctness, meta-language rejection of taboo by a political opponent has been a kind of a popular rhetoric pattern for the last few years. ; Le langage de la politique, porteur d'une représentation idéologique des relations au sein d'une communauté donnée, est par définition un domaine de la lutte discursive. Cela implique qu'en dehors des significations proposées, il comporte aussi des tentatives de couvrir le message concurrentiel ou discordant. Différentes formes du tabou constituent par conséquent son élément inséparable. Or, le discours public d'aujourd'hui (avec son côté néo-populiste) est parsemé de remarques métalinguistiques dans lesquelles le mot tabou apparaît explicitement ou est sémantiquement présent sous forme d'allusions à toutes sortes de thèmes interdits. À travers une analyse des contextes dans lesquels ce mot ou cette valeur sémantique apparaissent dans un corpus d'allocutions d'hommes politiques français couvrant la période 2008-2015, cet article – inspiré en partie des travaux du groupe de recherche DiSEM – tente de montrer que, tout comme la critique du politiquement correct et de ce qu'on appelle communément « la langue de bois », le rejet du tabou chez soi et sa dénonciation chez l'adversaire politique s'apparentent, ces dernières années, à une sorte d'artifice rhétorique obligé.

The paper aims to discuss the means of expressing and inferring emotions using as an example the lexical and iconic layers of the blogosphere of the French Outraged movement. The analysis is based on a corpus of content taken from a dozen blogs written in France between 2010 and 2013. In the course ofthe analysis based on theoretical assumptions of modern discourse and argumentation analysis, the author concludes that the expression of outrage in the texts under investigation is a kind of emotional form which the active co-authors of the blogs actualize in their own manner and by doing so they create not so much pathos but rather ethos – both individual and communal, based on a system of shared values and beliefs. On the other hand, argumentation through emotions usually takes place indirectly, mostly by means of axiologically charged subjectification of discourse. ; The paper aims to discuss the means of expressing and inferring emotions using as an example the lexical and iconic layers of the blogosphere of the French Outraged movement. The analysis is based on a corpus of content taken from a dozen blogs written in France between 2010 and 2013. In the course of the analysis based on theoretical assumptions of modern discourse and argumentation analysis, the author concludes that the expression of outrage in the texts under investigation is a kind of emotional form which the active co-authors of the blogs actualize in their own manner and by doing so they create not so much pathos but rather ethos – both individual and communal, based on a system of shared values and beliefs. On the other hand, argumentation through emotions usually takes place indirectly, mostly by means of axiologically charged subjectification of discourse.

This analysis reviews pro-European and anti-European attitudes in the political life of Visegrad Group states in 1989–2004. It was not easy to identify these attitudes, as the profile of Central European political parties often depended on the personalities of their most prominent persons and their political platforms, especially during the first period of the post-communist era, and these did not keep pace with the changes that occurred around them. In the first half of the decade, integration with the EC/EU was considered an issue related to foreign policy. This was conducive to maintaining a superficial consensus on the matter. As negotiations went into more detail and their finalisation came closer, the political scene became more strongly diversified into three main orientations: "pro-European", "anti-European" and "Eurosceptic" – based on disputes concerning internal reforms and the pace of these reforms, membership conditions, relations with other European countries or the target integration model. Both pro-European and anti-European discourses were based to a certain extent on emotional arguments, and this did not lead to deeper debates on issues related to integration. ; This analysis reviews pro-European and anti-European attitudes in the political life of Visegrad Group states in 1989–2004. It was not easy to identify these attitudes, as the profile of Central European political parties often depended on the personalities of their most prominent persons and their political platforms, especially during the first period of the post-communist era, and these did not keep pace with the changes that occurred around them. In the first half of the decade, integration with the EC/EU was considered an issue related to foreign policy. This was conducive to maintaining a superficial consensus on the matter. As negotiations went into more detail and their finalisation came closer, the political scene became more strongly diversified into three main orientations: "pro-European", "anti-European" and "Eurosceptic" – based on disputes concerning internal reforms and the pace of these reforms, membership conditions, relations with other European countries or the target integration model. Both pro-European and anti-European discourses were based to a certain extent on emotional arguments, and this did not lead to deeper debates on issues related to integration.

Niniejsza analiza stanowi przegląd pro- i antyeuropejskich postaw w życiu politycznym państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w latach 1989-2004. Ich identyfikacja nie była sprawą prostą, gdyż profil środkowoeuropejskich formacji politycznych często zależał od tworzących je osobistości, a programy partyjne, zwłaszcza w pierwszym okresie postkomunizmu, nie nadążały za zmianami w otoczeniu zewnętrznym. W pierwszej połowie dekady, integracja z WE/UE, uznawana była za zagadnienie związane z polityką zagraniczną, co sprzyjało utrzymywaniu się powierzchownego konsensusu w tej kwestii. W miarę wchodzenia w szczegóły negocjacji i zbliżania się rozstrzygnięć następowało coraz silniejsze różnicowanie się sceny politycznej na trzy główne orientacje - "pro-europejską", "anty-europejską" oraz "eurosceptyczną" - na tle sporów wokół reform wewnętrznych i ich tempa, warunków członkostwa, stosunków z innymi krajami europejskimi czy docelowego modelu integracji. Zarówno dyskurs pro-jak i anty-europejski opierały się tu do pewnego stopnia na argumentach emocjonalnych, co nie sprzyjało pogłębieniu debaty na tematy związane z integracją. ; This analysis reviews pro-European and anti-European attitudes in the political life of Visegrad Group states in 1989-2004. It was not easy to identify these attitudes, as the profile of Central European political parties often depended on the personalities of their most prominent persons and their political platforms, especially during the first period of the post-communist era, and these did not keep pace with the changes that occurred around them. In the first half of the decade, integration with the EC/EU was considered an issue related to foreign policy. This was conducive to maintaining a superficial consensus on the matter. As negotiations went into more detail and their finalisation came closer, the political scene became more strongly diversified into three main orientations: "pro-European", "anti-European" and "Eurosceptic" - based on disputes concerning internal reforms and the pace of these reforms, membership conditions, relations with other European countries or the target integration model. Both pro-European and anti-European discourses were based to a certain extent on emotional arguments, and this did not lead to deeper debates on issues related to integration.