External performance in low-income countries
In: Occasional paper 272
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In: Occasional paper 272
In: Princeton studies in international finance 86
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 27, Issue 2, p. 213-239
In: IMF Working Paper No. 2002/228
SSRN
In: Temi di discussione del Servizio Studi 209
In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 57, Issue 6, p. 668-681
In: IMF Working Paper, p. 1-65
SSRN
The Eurosystem and the U.S. Federal Reserve System follow quite different approaches to the execution of monetary policy. The former institution adopts a hands-off approach that largely delegates to depository institutions the task of stabilizing their own liquidity at high frequency. The latter institution follows a much more hands-on approach involving daily intervention to fine-tune the liquidity of the banking system. We review the implications of these contrasting approaches, focusing on their impact on the high-frequency behavior of very short-term interest rates. We also examine interest rate behavior following the Y2K date change and the 9/11/2001 crisis - events that required the two central banks to deviate significantly from their customary style of liquidity management. We find that, despite differences in operational framework, certain elements of the institutions' styles of day-to-day intervention have caused very short-term interest rates to behave similarly in the euro area and the United States. Significantly, during periods of anticipated or actual crisis, the two institutions have acted very much alike in managing the liquidity of the interbank market in response to shocks.
BASE
The volatility patterns of overnight interest rates differ across industrial countries in ways that existing models, designed to replicate the features of the U.S. federal funds market, cannot explain. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches these different patterns by incorporating differences in policy execution by the world's main central banks, including differences in central banks' management of marginal lending and deposit facilities in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks' observed practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as the targeting of exchange rates.
BASE
In: Journal of international economics, Volume 49, Issue 1, p. 1-29
ISSN: 0022-1996
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In: IMF Working Paper No. 98/156
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In: Economic policy, Volume 12, Issue 24, p. 13-52
ISSN: 1468-0327
In: IMF Working Paper, p. 1-61
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