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This thesis is a collection of three essays about the economics of coordination. Coordination issues arise when, in presence of multiple equilibria, heterogeneously informed agents need to coordinate with each other towards a Pareto-superior outcome. Electoral outcomes, collective decision-making, currency attacks or polit- ical regime changes examples of coordination problems. The first chapter provides a game theoretic analysis of group decision making, investigating how an agent's communication behavior is affected by different voting systems. I show that in an ideal state where communication is noisy but agents can communicate without opportunity costs, agents will always reach unanimous consensus regardless of which voting system governs the deliberative process. I further show that under the more realistic case in which communication involves opportunity costs, voting systems shape an agent's communication behavior. Specifically, when the opportunity costs of communication are low, a voting system based on unanimity approximates the results of the ideal state. Conversely, when communication involves high opportunity costs, a voting system based on majority is more desirable. The second essay is an experimental test of the predictions developed in the first chapter. The experiment is designed to determine how different voting institutions in uence the process of communication of collective decision bodies when communication can be costly. In contrast with the existing literature, I have found that different voting institutions induce different decision outcomes. In particular, a voting system based on unanimity fosters subjects' communication and information sharing. Once subjects choose to communicate, I also have observed that communication unambiguously improves the quality of the decision outcome across each voting rule. The third and final essay provides a political regime-change interpretation of the organized crime phe- nomenon. Under the assumption that the a criminal organization in a society benefits of the support of individuals, I investigate the strategic interplay between a criminal organization and a large number of citizens who might be more inclined to support the criminal organization rather than reporting its illegal activities to the legal authority. Borrowing from the economic literature on coordination and regime change, I model a criminal organization as an autocratic regime and claim that illegal activities are used in order to raise citizens support.