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The Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats each allow their members to participate in the selection of the party leader. It also examines the consequences of all-member ballots in leadership elections. It looks at how parties remove leaders, showing that each of the major British parties sought to make it harder to evict incumbents.

The Conservative, Labour and the Liberal Democrats parties each allow their members to participate in the selection of the party leader, where previously this task was left to MPs. This book examines the consequences of the shift to all-member ballots through a series of case studies of recent leadership contests. It presents a wealth of evidence to show that, when party members choose leaders, they normally use the same selection criteria that MPs use: acceptability, electability and competence. Democratisation of leadership selection has not led to the election of radical leaders, but has proved compatible with the parties' major goals of internal unity and a broad electoral appeal. The book also assesses the ways in which parties remove leaders who have outstayed their welcome. It shows that, although all the major parties have sought to make it harder to eject leaders, Labour leaders are offered the most protection by their party's eviction rules.

Few parties have undergone such comprehensive organizational change as the Labour Party since 1983. Labour's organization once institutionalised the political exchange between office-seeking politicians and the party's policy-seeking trade union paymasters. Using accessible rational choice models, Thomas Quinn explores how consecutive election defeats prompted party leaders to modernize this structure to regain voters' trust, reducing union influence in policymaking, parliamentary candidate selection and leadership contests. The price may be a centralized party vulnerable to membership exit an

AbstractBritish debates over electoral reform are invariably debates about what party system would emerge. While there is agreement that proportional representation (PR) would boost the size of existing smaller parties, there is no consensus over the emergence and prospering of new parties. The main weakness in the British debate concerns the types of governments that would form under PR. Some believe the Liberal Democrats would be perennial kingmakers. Others suggest that a 'progressive alliance' on the centre‐left would sweep all before it. This article considers the experience of west European multiparty systems since the 1980s and argues that party system fragmentation and the growth of non‐centrist parties would characterise Britain under PR. Moreover, the pattern of overlapping centrist coalitions seen in Germany and Benelux would be unlikely to emerge in Britain. Instead, a two‐bloc system, common in Scandinavia and southern Europe, would most likely develop.

British parties have pioneered the use of 'one-member, one-vote' ballots to select their leaders. However, the elections of Jeremy Corbyn (Labour) and Liz Truss (Conservative) prompted calls to return leadership selection to parliamentarians. Critics claim that party members are non-centrist and liable to impose unsuitable leaders on MPs. This weakens the cohesion of parliamentary parties, undermining the functioning of Britain's majoritarian democracy. This article assesses the major parties' leader-selection systems. It goes beyond existing research by identifying and applying four evaluative criteria for selection institutions: legitimacy, parliamentary acceptability, leader-eviction and timeliness. It shows that most criticisms of one-member, one-vote are overstated because the latter is heavily mediated by ex-ante and/or ex-post parliamentary controls, for example, nomination thresholds and confidence votes. One-member, one-vote generally produces leaders acceptable to MPs; 'unsuitable' ones typically arise when the parliamentary controls fail. However, key institutional weaknesses are identified: legitimacy in the Conservatives' system and leader-eviction in Labour's.

This article examines the strategic options facing small centrist third parties in two-party parliamentary systems operating under the single-member district plurality electoral system. It uses a spatial model to show that centrist third parties are better off targeting the 'safe' districts of a major party rather than marginal districts. Furthermore, it is optimal to target one party's districts, not both, to benefit from tactical and protest voting. This article also questions the implicit conclusion of the median-legislator theorem that pivotality-seeking is the best strategy for a third party, at least under the single-member district plurality system, because that would usurp voters' ability to select the executive directly, a key feature of two-partism. Finally, this article shows that third parties can damage themselves if they 'flip' their strategies from opposing particular major parties to supporting them. Evidence is provided for the British Liberal Democrats and New Zealand's historic Social Credit Party.

This article examines the British Labour Party's leadership election of 2015 , which resulted in the unexpected victory of the radical-left candidate, Jeremy Corbyn. It looks at the contest using Stark's academic model of leadership elections, based on the tripod of selection criteria acceptability, electability and competence, and finds it wanting. Selection rules, which are downplayed in Stark's model, are then examined, as Labour used a new selection system based on one-member-one-vote in 2015. While these are found to have had some impact, Corbyn's victory cannot be explained primarily by institutions. The article reconsiders Stark's model and shows that it failed because of the diminished significance of electability as a selection criterion in the Labour leadership contest of 2015. That largely reflected the circumstances in which the contest took place, in the aftermath of a demoralising election defeat for Labour.

AbstractThis article critically examines the concept of 'accountability' as it is understood in two‐party systems and majoritarian democracy – namely the ability of voters to remove governments that violate their mandates or otherwise perform poorly. Voters' capacity to 'throw the rascals out' is one of the main normative appeals of two‐partism and the single‐member plurality (SMP) electoral system. However, this article uses a spatial model to show that in at least two types of situation voters are left in a bind when confronted with a mandate‐breaking governing party: (1) when both major parties undertake unexpected non‐centrist shifts in opposing directions after an election, leaving centrist voters with an unappealing choice; and (2) when a governing party that had won an election on a non‐centrist platform undertakes a post‐election shift to the centre, leaving its more radical supporters dissatisfied. In each case, voters have four imperfect options: punish the governing party by throwing the rascals out, but in doing so vote for a party that is ideologically more distant; abstain, and withdraw from the democratic process; vote for a minor party that has no hope of influencing government formation, but which might detach enough votes to allow the ideologically more distant major opposition party to win; and forgive the governing party its mandate‐breaking. All of these options represent accountability failures. The problems are illustrated with two case studies from two‐party systems: the United Kingdom in the mid‐1980s and New Zealand in the period 1984–1993. In both instances, many voters found it difficult to 'throw the rascals out' without harming their own interests in the process. The article concludes that accountability may sometimes be better achieved if voters can force a party to share power in coalition with another party in order to 'keep it honest' instead of removing it from government completely, as can happen in multi‐party systems based on proportional representation. Thus, although two‐partism based on plurality voting is normally regarded as superior to multi‐partism and proportional representation on the criterion of accountability, in some instances, the reverse can be true. The article therefore undermines a core normative argument advanced by supporters of majoritarian democracy and SMP.