This book discusses under what conditions states can take unilateral action to promote the interests of the international community. It puts forward an argument in favour of unilateral action in the common interest, but suggests a number of restraining techniques to limit its intrusiveness
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Abstract The Restatement of the Law (Fourth): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States is a monumental work, which, just like the Restatement (Third), may prove influential abroad. This also applies to its restatement of the law of jurisdiction. The clarity of the relevant chapters on jurisdiction, including the reporters' notes, is admirable. Comparing the Restatement (Third) to the Restatement (Fourth), it is striking that the latter places greater emphasis on US law-based jurisdictional limitations. The relevance of the customary international law of jurisdiction has correspondingly diminished, especially in regard to jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate. This commentary critiques this shift towards jurisdictional 'parochialism'. It singles out (i) the drafters' characterization of the principle of jurisdictional reasonableness as a principle of US statutory interpretation (prescriptive comity) rather than a customary international law norm limiting prescriptive jurisdiction and (ii) the drafters' view that the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction is not constrained by customary international law.
The Restatement of the Law (Fourth): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States is a monumental work, which, just like the Restatement (Third), may prove influential abroad. This also applies to its restatement of the law of jurisdiction. The clarity of the relevant chapters on jurisdiction, including the reporters' notes, is admirable. Comparing the Restatement (Third) to the Restatement (Fourth), it is striking that the latter places greater emphasis on US law-based jurisdictional limitations. The relevance of the customary international law of jurisdiction has correspondingly diminished, especially in regard to jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate. This commentary critiques this shift towards jurisdictional 'parochialism'. It singles out (i) the drafters' characterization of the principle of jurisdictional reasonableness as a principle of US statutory interpretation (prescriptive comity) rather than a customary international law norm limiting prescriptive jurisdiction and (ii) the drafters' view that the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction is not constrained by customary international law.
The Restatement of the Law (Fourth): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States is a monumental work, which, just like the Restatement (Third), may prove influential abroad. This also applies to its restatement of the law of jurisdiction. The clarity of the relevant chapters on jurisdiction, including the reporters' notes, is admirable. Comparing the Restatement (Third) to the Restatement (Fourth), it is striking that the latter places greater emphasis on US law-based jurisdictional limitations. The relevance of the customary international law of jurisdiction has correspondingly diminished, especially in regard to jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate. This commentary critiques this shift towards jurisdictional 'parochialism'. It singles out (i) the drafters' characterization of the principle of jurisdictional reasonableness as a principle of US statutory interpretation (prescriptive comity) rather than a customary international law norm limiting prescriptive jurisdiction and (ii) the drafters' view that the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction is not constrained by customary international law.
In two decisions of 2019, the Dutch courts have come up with novel interpretations of the 'control-based' standard of attribution in the international law of State responsibility. This is a standard of attribution that is laid down in Article 8 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which is, by and large, reflective of customary international law. The traditional understanding of Article 8 ARSIWA is that it applies to relations between States and private persons or entities, in particular armed groups: conduct of a non-State armed group is attributed to a State to the extent that the State exercises control over that group. However, the Dutch courts have extended the scope of application of Article 8 ARSIWA to conduct of organs of international organisations (the UN) as well as foreign States (i.e., States other than the Netherlands). Internationally speaking, this is a novel interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, for which there are no precedents. After introducing the Dutch courts' reasoning in these cases, the contribution zooms out and inquires what the Dutch evolutions imply for the development of the controlbased attribution standard in the international law of State responsibility. The author argues that the relatively peculiar interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, as applying to interactions between States and international organisations and between States inter se, is practically viable in a narrow range of scenarios characterised by relatively strong politico-military relations and hierarchies.
In two decisions of 2019, the Dutch courts have come up with novel interpretations of the 'control-based' standard of attribution in the international law of State responsibility. This is a standard of attribution that is laid down in Article 8 of the International Law Commission's (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), which is, by and large, reflective of customary international law. The traditional understanding of Article 8 ARSIWA is that it applies to relations between States and private persons or entities, in particular armed groups: conduct of a non-State armed group is attributed to a State to the extent that the State exercises control over that group. However, the Dutch courts have extended the scope of application of Article 8 ARSIWA to conduct of organs of international organisations (the UN) as well as foreign States (i.e., States other than the Netherlands). Internationally speaking, this is a novel interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, for which there are no precedents. After introducing the Dutch courts' reasoning in these cases, the contribution zooms out and inquires what the Dutch evolutions imply for the development of the controlbased attribution standard in the international law of State responsibility. The author argues that the relatively peculiar interpretation of Article 8 ARSIWA, as applying to interactions between States and international organisations and between States inter se, is practically viable in a narrow range of scenarios characterised by relatively strong politico-military relations and hierarchies.