Search results

The author examines the process of Soviet military involvement in the events that took place in Afghanistan from the viewpoint of the United States. This topic is poorly studied, and the author makes an attempt to fill this gap. The main goal of the paper is to consider the process of increasing involvement of the USSR in the interior Afghan affairs from the U.S. position and to trace how this position changed during 1979. Methods and materials: The author mainly relies on the document 'The secret correspondence of the foreign policy agencies of the United States on Afghanistan' and also draws documents from the U.S. Congress and a monthly bulletin from the U.S. State Department. Analysis. The special attention is paid to the period from the beginning of the spring of 1979 to the end of 1979, since it was during this period of time that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan continued to grow. Results: The author concludes that throughout 1979 and earlier, the U.S. closely followed the events in Afghanistan and Soviet actions there. However, the U.S. position on possible Soviet military involvement was expectant, and the USSR was not given strong protests, which could promote the Soviet decision on military intervention in the civil war in Afghanistan.

This article presents the analysis of the US involvement in the process of providing indirect military and other kinds of support to the Afghan mujahedeens. The author also presents a brief overview of the main methods and means of US military aid to the Afghan rebels in the 1980s, as well as a detailed consideration of the process of providing such assistance. The author identifies three stages in the process of interaction between the US administration and the US intelligence agencies, on the one hand, and the Afghan insurgency, on the other hand: the first stage (1978-1979) refers to introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, where the US assistance to Afghan rebels was extremely cautious and measured; the second stage (1980) is marked by a considerable build-up of military assistance to Mujahedeens, but the United States sought to conceal their participation in this process; and during the third stage (since the election of Ronald Reagan up to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan), the assistance to Mujahedeens increased in several times, and the US stopped hiding this fact. The author briefly discusses the role and place of such countries slong with the US as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and so on in the structure of rendering support to the Afghan Mujahideens. The author also studies the US role in Afghanistan's transformation into a "nest" for cultivating Islamic extremists.