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AbstractThe article provides an overview on the emergence of dispute resolution institutions in society and market, their pivotal role and their impact on the human activities. It introduces then recent researches conducted by a pool of scholars in order to advance the understanding of modern judicial institutions which represent the aims of this journal issue.

Background: Scholarly publishing is an essential vehicle for actively participating in the scientific debate and for sustaining the invisible colleges of the modern research environment, which extend far beyond the borders of individual research institutions. However, its current dynamics have deeply transformed the scientific life and conditioned in new ways the economics of academic knowledge production. They have also challenged the perceived common sense view of scientific research. Method: Analytical approach to set out a comprehensive framework on the current debate on scholarly publishing and to shed light on the peculiar organization and the working of this peculiar productive sector. Result: The way in which scientific knowledge is produced and transmitted has been dramatically affected by the series of recent major technosocietal transformations. Although the effects are many, in particular the current overlap and interplay between two distinct and somewhat opposite stances—scientific and economic—tend to blur the overall understanding of what scholarly publishing is and produces distortion on its working which in turn affect the scientific activities. The outcome is thus a series of intended and unintended effects on the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge. Conclusion: The article suggests that a substantial transformation characterizes science today that seems more like a thrusting, entrepreneurial business than a contemplative, disinterested endeavor. In this essay, we provide a general overview of the pivotal role of the scholarly publishing in fostering this change and its pros and cons connected to the idiosyncratic interplay between social norms and market stances.

PurposeClass action (CA) has long been used in practice (mainly in the USA) and studied by academics especially in the shareholder protection area. This paper aims to apply the same practice within the current financial meltdown context.Design/methodology/approachThe paper faces the issue by comparingex anteregulation with anex postregulatory system, basically dependent on the action of the consumer who can sue firms that behave unfairly. The arguments are provided by the law and economics (LE) approach.FindingsAccording to LE, pure economic loss is a private loss that is not socially relevant but simply implies a redistribution of wealth. Consequently, wrongful behavior that induces reallocation of costs and benefits with no consequences on social welfare is not considered socially harmful, so is not necessarily subject to compensation. Since pure economic loss is very often financial, the above reasoning also applies to financial markets. However, the same LE arguments suggest that in financial markets, the policy of internalizing pure economic loss by means of CAs can be more far‐sighted than simply compensating the victims: the liability system has the particular feature of producing deterrence and driving the market towards an efficient outcome.Originality/valueThe paper maintains that CA intended as a complementaryex postregulatory device can play a significant role in addressing a failure thatex anteregulation has not in financial markets. This is coherent with the LE tradition that interprets tort law remedies as a solution for internalizing externalities and providing the correct incentive to the markets.

Richard Posner's "What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?" (1993b) is not, as usually believed, the first analysis of judges' behaviors made by using the assumption that judges are rational and maximize a utility function. That analysis arrived at the end of a rather long process. This paper recounts the history of this process, from the "birth" of law and economics in the 1960s to 1993. We show that economic analyses of judges' behavior were introduced in the early 1970s under the pen of Posner. At that time, rationality was not modeled in terms of utility maximization. Utility maximization came later. We also show that rationality and incentives were introduced to explain the efficiency of common law. Around this theme, a controversy took place that led Posner and other economists to postpone their analysis of judicial behavior until the 1990s. By then, the situation had changed. New and conclusive evidence of judges' utility maximizing behavior demanded a general theory to be expressed. In addition, the context was favorable to Chicago economists. It was time for Posner to publish his article.

AbstractIn the present paper we contribute to the previous literature on de facto enforcing mechanisms, by focusing on the role of judicial institutions and their performance and measurement. We propose both theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the necessity of a clear distinction between two measures of judicial performance, efficiency and efficacy, which have often been confused in previous literature. Not only might economic actors not be affected to the same extent by these two indicators, but we show that these measures do not even correlate significantly with each other. We also bring evidence against the alleged trade-off between the quality of justice and judicial performance in its quantitative dimension, showing that this relationship is much more complicated than is claimed by some legal scholars.