A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation
In: The Lipsey lectures
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In: The Lipsey lectures
In: El trimestre económico, Volume 84, Issue 336, p. 761-769
ISSN: 2448-718X
El profesor Kenneth Arrow murió el 21 de febrero de 2017 a la edad de 95 años. Era universalmente considerado (junto con Paul Samuelson, John Hicks y posiblemente —dependiendo de los gustos— John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman y Gary Becker) como uno de los economistas más extraordinarios del siglo XX. También fue mi economista favorito de todos los tiempos.
In: Journal of human development and capabilities: a multi-disciplinary journal for people-centered development, Volume 17, Issue 3, p. 309-323
ISSN: 1945-2837
In: Understanding Poverty, p. 409-422
In: The American economist: journal of the International Honor Society in Economics, Omicron Delta Epsilon, Volume 44, Issue 2, p. 3-16
ISSN: 2328-1235
In: Blackwell readings for contemporary economics
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In: American economic review, Volume 113, Issue 11, p. 3044-3089
ISSN: 1944-7981
We conceptualize and measure upward mobility over income or wealth. At the core of our exercise is the Growth Progressivity Axiom: transfers of instantaneous growth rates from relatively rich to poor individuals increases upward mobility. This axiom, along with mild auxiliary restrictions, identifies an "upward mobility kernel" with a single free parameter, in which mobility is linear in individual growth rates, with geometrically declining weights on baseline incomes. We extend this kernel to trajectories over intervals. The analysis delivers an upward mobility index that does not rely on panel data. That significantly expands our analytical scope to data-poor settings. (JEL D31, D63, I32, O15, O40)
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Volume 179, Issue 3-4, p. 579
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: American economic review, Volume 113, Issue 1, p. 210-252
ISSN: 1944-7981
We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) projects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collaboration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collaborators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant "identities." We study payoff distributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and compare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. (JEL A11, D82, I23)
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In: Journal of development economics, Volume 154, p. 102759
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of political economy, Volume 128, Issue 5, p. 1789-1825
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: NBER Working Paper No. w26658
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