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Although Niklas Luhmann refrains from an explicit treatment of power as a force of social constraint, I propose that, if partially reconstructed, his Systems Theory can illuminate the subject considerably. I show this by distinguishing between five elements in Luhmann's treatment of each of the following six social subsystems: the economy, politics, law, science, religion and education. The five subsystem elements are: (1) a binary code, (2) a basis of authority, (3) a language of social communication, (4) a generalized medium of communication, and (5) a social function. Whereas Luhmann assumes that each subsystem approximates autopoiesis, or self‐contained internal operation and autonomy, I assume the pervasiveness of interpenetration, whereby operations is one subsystem nonetheless affect operations in others. Subsequently, I juxtapose the reconstructed systems‐theoretic framework developed in the first half of the paper with Michel Foucault's power/knowledge framework. I conclude that the use of a reconstructed systems‐theoretic approach, based loosely on Luhmann's original theory, could greatly illuminate the specifics of power/knowledge in modern societies, to an even greater extent than Foucault does himself.

An extensive body of research indicates that adult drug courts reduce reoffending, whereas a more limited number of studies point to reductions in drug use as well. However, barely any research examines whether these programs produce benefits in other areas, including socioeconomic well-being, family relationships, mental health, and homelessness. To fill this important gap, findings are presented from a quasi-experimental study of 1,156 drug court participants from 23 sites and 625 comparison offenders from 6 sites where drug courts are unavailable. Six-month follow-up interviews were conducted with 1,533 offenders (86%) and 18-month interviews with 1,474 (83%) offenders. Findings indicate that drug courts produced modest positive effects (though many were not statistically significant) across a range of socioeconomic outcomes. Findings also indicate that drug courts reduced family conflict. However, significant effects were not evident with respect to emotional or instrumental support from family members, mental health, or homelessness.

Argues that social classes have not died, but declined substantially in political significance, justifying a shift from class-centered analysis to multicausal explanations of political behavior & related social phenomena. Here, the key propositions of Clark & Lipset (1991) are extended, & new empirical evidence is added to commentaries by Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, & Jeff Manza (2001 [1993]) & Jan Pakulski (2001). Four general propositions are stated concerning where & why class is weaker or stronger, & then applied to several areas to consider how class has weakened in its impact, especially on politics. Several writers of Marxist background are cited to show how they have converged with others in interpreting central developments. The importance of organizations like unions & parties, independent of classes, in affecting political processes is noted. The rise of the welfare state in generally weakening class conflict by providing a safety net & benefits is discussed. The diversification of the occupational structure toward small firms, high-technology industries, & services weakens class organizational potentials, as does rising affluence. Political parties have correspondingly shifted from class conflict to noneconomic issues, eg, the environment. In many countries, the socialist & communist parties have drastically altered their programs away from traditional class politics toward new social issues & often toward constraining government. New nationalist parties have arisen stressing national identity & limiting immigration. Ways that these developments have cumulatively weakened class politics are described. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 57 References. Adapted from the source document.

Argues that social classes have not died, but declined substantially in political significance, justifying a shift from class-centered analysis to multicausal explanations of political behavior & related social phenomena. Here, the key propositions of Clark & Lipset (1991) are extended, & new empirical evidence is added to commentaries by Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, & Jeff Manza (2001 [1993]) & Jan Pakulski (2001). Four general propositions are stated concerning where & why class is weaker or stronger, & then applied to several areas to consider how class has weakened in its impact, especially on politics. Several writers of Marxist background are cited to show how they have converged with others in interpreting central developments. The importance of organizations like unions & parties, independent of classes, in affecting political processes is noted. The rise of the welfare state in generally weakening class conflict by providing a safety net & benefits is discussed. The diversification of the occupational structure toward small firms, high-technology industries, & services weakens class organizational potentials, as does rising affluence. Political parties have correspondingly shifted from class conflict to noneconomic issues, eg, the environment. In many countries, the socialist & communist parties have drastically altered their programs away from traditional class politics toward new social issues & often toward constraining government. New nationalist parties have arisen stressing national identity & limiting immigration. Ways that these developments have cumulatively weakened class politics are described. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 57 References. Adapted from the source document.

Social classes have not died, but their political significance has declined substantially; this justifies a shift from class-centred analysis towards multi-causal explanations of political behaviour and related social phenomena. This contribution extends key propositions from Clark and Lipset and adds new empirical evidence to the commentaries by Hout et al. and Pakulski. Four general propositions are stated concerning where and why class is weaker or stronger. The propositions are then applied to several areas, considering how class has weakened in its impact, especially on politics. We cite several writers of Marxist background to show how they have converged with others in interpreting central developments. The paper notes the impact of organisations like parties and unions, independent of classes, in affecting political processes. It points to the rise of the welfare state as generally weakening class conflict by providing a safety-net and benefits. The diversification of the occupational structure toward small firms, high tech and services weakens class organisational potentials. So does more affluence. Political parties have correspondingly shifted from class conflict to non-economic issues like the environment. The Socialist and Communist Parties have drastically altered their programmes in dozens of countries, away from traditional class politics toward new social issues, and often even toward constraining government. New nationalist parties have arisen stressing national identity and limiting immigration. These developments cumulatively weaken class politics.

Demographic, criminal history, instant case, treatment modality, program failure, and re-arrest data were collected from 400 New York City drug court participants. Actuarial risk scores were created for program failure and re-arrest by performing stepwise logistic regressions based on criminal history, present case, and demographic predictors of these outcomes. Placement in a residential (vs. outpatient) setting increased the likelihood of program failure and re-arrest after controlling for actuarial risk scores. Residential placement was particularly counter-productive with low-risk program participants, whose re-arrest rate was more than double that of low-risk participants placed in an outpatient setting. Conversely, placement of low-risk participants in the least restrictive treatment modality—a non-intensive outpatient setting—lowered the likelihood of re-arrest relative to placement either in a residential setting or an intensive outpatient program. Results are discussed in terms of the Risk-need-responsivity model of offender intervention, which recommends avoiding overly restrictive treatment of low-risk offenders.