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In this article I examine and compare Danish and Norwegian decision-making on the purchase of replacement fighter jets. The aim of this article is, first and foremost, to determine the extent to which the two countries' inclinations to buy the F-35 have been motivated by political and alliance-related considerations. I thus pose the question: Is the American F-35 preferred essentially because it is an American aircraft? Or is it simply perceived to be the most promising and cost-effective choice? Second, I investigate the limited use of political or alliance-related arguments in the national debates on the procurement plans. In other words, I ask why key policymakers have apparently done their best to keep political lines of reasoning out of the public discourse. Why has the acquisition program's possible effect on the two countries' position within NATO and vis-a-vis the US been effectively downplayed by policymakers as a criterion for the final selection? Adapted from the source document.

Since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the Alliance's minor partners have persistently spent a smaller share of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on military measures than their larger brothers-in-arms do. Taking my cue from collective goods theory, I examine the factors shaping the armament behaviour and military spending patterns of the smaller allies. The article's main theoretical argument is that the smallest among allies tend to perceive their military instruments as the price of admission to a collective defence organization upheld by larger and more potent powers. In essence, military spending becomes the price of security guarantees and protection. Consequently, small allies raise their military expenditures when their security-guaranteeing senior partner threatens with sanctions that the small ally considers more costly than the requested increase in military expenditures and not as a response to rising threats. In the second section of the article, this theoretical claim is illustrated and assessed against Denmark's Cold War defence policies. The empirical findings corroborate the belief that the small allies' leading policy-makers view their armed forces as a necessary evil maintained in order to profit from their senior partners' capabilities.