Search results

While scholars have made great strides in formulating theories and measuring public attention, "most important problem" and media‐based indicators are less than ideal measures. In order to address this shortcoming, this article borrows from health‐care epidemiology to measure public attention based on Internet search trends. In doing so, it reviews the innovative ways in which scientists have used search activity to track the spread of infectious disease, discusses the ease and flexibility with which search data can be gathered, and then subjects a Google‐based search measure to a series of validity tests. In particular, the analysis subjects the proposed measure to a battery of visual and statistical tests for convergent validity by comparing it with the most commonly used media‐based measure of public attention—issue coverage in the New York Times. Across a range of policy issues (health care, global warming, and terrorism), the proposed measure demonstrates convergent validity. The article concludes by posing a series of important questions that the new measure will allow researchers to address.

Though the policy science movement was born with the purpose of counseling the Department of Defense on a plethora of security matters, modern research within the field of public policy has tended to neglect issues of defense and security focusing instead on a wide variety of domestic problems. This nearly exclusive focus on domestic issues remained largely intact until September 11, 2001, when the threat of terrorism propelled defense and security back onto the disciplinary research agenda. Though exceptionally slow to adjust, policy scholars are gradually coming to terms with this new reality and are beginning to focus on security and defense in a way that informs policymakers and advances policy theory. This research note is meant to introduce interested readers to this trend by exploring broad themes and exemplar works within the field over the last few years. Adapted from the source document.

ObjectiveTo propose a new indicator of public attention to electoral candidates based on the relative pattern of Internet queries for opposing candidates.MethodsTo demonstrate the validity of this measure, we use ordinary least squares regression and an F‐ratio test.ResultsWe find that this measure, based on Google Insights data, behaves in a manner consistent with a valid measure of public attention. Moreover, this finding holds when the measure is included in a standard model used to explain U.S. Senate election outcomes.ConclusionThe Google Insights measure of relative public attention shows the shifts in public attention as the campaign is waged and is consistent with how we would expect to see such a measure behave. This research opens numerous avenues for research in the campaigns and elections subfield.

AbstractWe provide the first account of the culture wars in the political psychology and public opinion literature based on a theory of culture. Using innovative measures of grid‐group cultural theory (CT), we identify the cultures associated with ideological and partisan identifications in annual U.S. national surveys from 2011 to 2022, a unique data set of 24,870 respondents. As hypothesized, we find that the culture wars occur not just between ideologues and partisans but among them as they draw support from distinct, relatively stable yet shifting cultural coalitions. Egalitarian and, less often, fatalistic liberals and Democrats battle against individualistic and, less often, hierarchical, conservatives and Republicans. As hypothesized, fatalists are the least reliable coalition partners, and, as expected, they gravitate Republican and conservative in 2017, after Trump's election. However, fatalists who are strong partisan identifiers never defect. Moreover, our hypothesis that fatalist attraction to Trump would drive defections in their political identification is largely invalidated. Instead, fatalists mostly flee Trump in our aggregate analysis as well as in subanalyses of strong and weak ideological and partisan identifiers. In 2016 and 2018–2022, it appears that independent fatalists cause fatalists to gravitate liberal and Democrat. Unexpectedly, hierarchists also go liberal and Democrat in 2022, in apparent reaction to Trump's multifront attacks on the 2020 election that he lost. We identify the basis for cultural coalitions that can end particular culture wars, including the most significant one now occurring between egalitarians and individualists, and conclude with suggestions for further research.

Until recently for advocacy groups, influencing public opinion meant press releases, newspaper articles and emails. Now, social media gives such groups the ability to advocate much more widely and at lower cost. In new research, Kuhika Gupta, Joseph T. Ripberger, and Wesley Wehde look at how opposing advocacy groups construct narratives via social media. They find that pro and anti-nuclear groups used individual tweets to construct policy narratives featuring heroes, villains and victims.

Does public attention to political candidates impact fundraising margins in U.S. Senate elections? Applying a novel conceptualization of public attention, we examine U.S. Senate elections from 2004 through 2014 and find that increases in relative public attention relate to increases in head-to-head fundraising margins in open seat races. We conclude by asking whether or not all attention to candidates is "good" attention. Evidence from the 2006 Allen/Webb election suggests that all attention is not "good" attention. This race demonstrates that candidates can supply attention-grabbing action that increases relative public attention while stimulating exceptional losses in relative fundraising margins. Further research must clearly theorize conditions under which supplying public attention-grabbing behavior may damage political campaigns.

Dating back to Harry S. Truman, a number of presidents and prominent political leaders have tried, in some way or another, to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy. Throughout the years, such attempts have prompted countless international debates and spawned a cottage industry of security research related to the eventual elimination of nuclear arms. However, aside from the occasional foray, this research paradigm generally overlooks the domestic political obstacles that policy makers should expect to encounter if national security policy continues down the path toward nuclear zero. In pursuit of this goal, this article empirically examines public attitudes concerning the continued pursuit of nuclear abolition. In doing so, we highlight the beliefs and perceptions that inform public preferences concerning the importance assigned to retaining nuclear weapons today.Desde la época de Harry S. Truman, muchos presidentes y líderes políticos han intentado, de una u otra forma, reducir la dependencia de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos en armas nucleares. A través de los años estos intentos han provocado sinnúmero de debates internacionales y generado una pequeña industria dedicada a la investigación de una posible eliminación de armas nucleares. Sin embargo, este enfoque investigativo generalmente pasa por alto los obstáculos políticos domésticos que los legisladores deberían esperar si la política de seguridad nacional continúa por el camino de la abolición nuclear. En búsqueda de este objetivo, este artículo examina empíricamente las actitudes públicas respecto a la contínua búsqueda de una abolición nuclear. Al mismo tiempo, destacamos las creencias y percepciones que informan las preferencias públicas atribuidas a la importancia de preservar armas nucleares en la actualidad.