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For centuries, medicine aimed to treat abnormalities. But today normality itself is open to medical modification. Equipped with a new molecular understanding of bodies and minds, and new techniques for manipulating basic life processes at the level of molecules, cells, and genes, medicine now seeks to manage human vital processes. The Politics of Life Itself offers a much-needed examination of recent developments in the life sciences and biomedicine that have led to the widespread politicization of medicine, human life, and biotechnology. Avoiding the hype of popular science a

In this paper I suggest that we might understand some features of contemporary populism by reworking the concept of 'authoritarian populism' first proposed by Stuart Hall in his analysis of 'Thatcherism'. Following a brief review of my earlier analytics of 'governing through freedom', I suggest that while the political movements identified by the names of Trump, Wilders, Le Pen, the Austrian Freedom Party, the True Finns etc. may be ephemeral, it is worth considering whether they are beginning to articulate a new set of rationalities and technologies for governing 'after neoliberalism'. I analyse some key elements of these movements, the new epistemologies that they employ and the ethopolitics that they espouse, and suggest that the key operative concepts may be 'the people', security and control. We may still be 'birds on the wire' as Leonard Cohen once put it, but perhaps what we are enjoined to seek in these strategies for 'governing liberty' is not so much freedom but security.

The human body was made legible long ago. But what of the human mind? Is it possible to 'read' the mind, for one human being to know what another is thinking or feeling, their beliefs and intentions. And if I can read your mind, how about others – could our authorities, in the criminal justice system or the security services? Some developments in contemporary neuroscience suggest the answer to this question is 'yes'. While philosophers continue to debate the mind-brain problem, a range of novel technologies of brain imaging have been used to argue that specific mental states, and even specific thoughts, can be identified by characteristic patterns of brain activation; this has led some to propose their use in practices ranging from lie detection and security screening to the assessment of brain activity in persons in persistent vegetative states. This article reviews the history of these developments, sketches their scientific and technical bases, considers some of the epistemological and ontological mutations involved, explores the ecological niches where they have found a hospitable environment, and considers some implications of this materialization of the readable, knowable, transparent mind.

We live, according to some, in the century of biology, where we now understand ourselves in radically new ways as the insights of genomics and neuroscience have opened up the workings of our bodies and our minds to new kinds of knowledge and intervention. Is a new figure of the human, and of the social, taking shape in the 21st century? With what consequences for the politics of life today? And with what implications, if any, for the social, cultural and human sciences? These are the issues that are discussed in this article, which argues that a new relation is requred with the life sciences, beyond commentary and critique, if the social and human sciences are to revitalize themselves for the 21st century.

We live, according to some, in the century of biology where we now understand ourselves in radically new ways, as the insights of genomics and neuroscience have opened up the workings of our bodies and our minds to new kinds of knowledge and intervention. Is a new figure of the human, and of the social, taking shape in the twenty first century? With what consequences for the politics of life today? And with what implications, if any, for the social, cultural and human sciences? These are the issues that are discussed in this paper, which argues that a new relation is requred with the life sciences, beyond commentary and critique, if the social and human sciences are to revitalize tehmselves for the twenty-first century.

Dans cet article, je montre la pertinence toujours actuelle d'Histoire de la folie de Michel Foucault et de ses cours sur le pouvoir psychiatrique pour analyser le système psychiatrique d'aujourd'hui. Cette pertinence tient au fait que les analyses de Foucault font moins l'histoire que la généalogie de la psychiatrie ; elles montrent que nos façons de poser l'existence de ce que nous appelons folie se rattachent au même mouvement historique qui a créé la psychiatrie en tant que savoir pouvant désigner et gérer les fous. J'explore la relation ambiguë entre Foucault et « l'antipsychiatrie » des années 1960 et 1970, notamment dans le cas des travaux de R. D. Laing. J'examine aussi dans quelle mesure les cours de Foucault sur les anormaux et le pouvoir psychiatrique nous aident à analyser une psychiatrie qui oeuvre à l'extérieur de l'asile, qui s'appuie sur les neurosciences moléculaires et qui est dominée par la psychopharmacologie. Je soutiens que l'héritage le plus radical de Foucault n'est ni une critique du modèle médical, ni une négation du réel de la folie, ni non plus une dénonciation du pouvoir psychiatrique, mais plutôt l'argument voulant que les sujets de la psychiatrie aient le droit, le pouvoir en fait, de décider des formes de traitements qu'ils reçoivent.

This article explores contemporary biopolitics in the light of Michel Foucault's oft quoted suggestion that contemporary politics calls `life itself' into question. It suggests that recent developments in the life sciences, biomedicine and biotechnology can usefully be analysed along three dimensions. The first concerns logics of control - for contemporary biopolitics is risk politics. The second concerns the regime of truth in the life sciences - for contemporary biopolitics is molecular politics. The third concerns technologies of the self - for contemporary biopolitics is ethopolitics. The article suggests that, in these events, human beings have become `somatic individuals': personhood is increasingly being defined in terms of corporeality, and new and direct relations are established between our biology and our conduct. At the same time, this somatic and corporeal individuality has become opened up to choice, prudence and responsibility, to experimentation, to contestation and so to a politics of `life itself'.