Why the Poor Vote in Dominant-Party Systems: Community Carrots and Social Sticks
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2017-25
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In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2017-25
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of experimental political science: JEPS, p. 1-11
ISSN: 2052-2649
Abstract
What motivates property owners to pay taxes in places where state enforcement is weak? Using an online experiment among property owners in Lagos, Nigeria, we evaluate the effectiveness of different appeals at increasing respondents' tax morale—willingness to pay taxes absent enforcement—and attitudes about government enforcement of tax collection. Respondents were randomly assigned to read either a vignette emphasizing the role of property tax revenues in contributing to economic growth and increased property values or one highlighting that tax revenues are used for public goods and services benefiting all residents. The growth and property values message made respondents significantly more favorable toward enforcement of tax collection, but there was no difference in willingness to pay between the two conditions.
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 1-28
ISSN: 1936-6167
World Affairs Online
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Volume 58, Issue 1, p. 1-28
ISSN: 1936-6167
AbstractGovernments often have contentious relationships with residents of urban informal settlements. Motivated by the desire for rents and dreams of becoming the next luxury destination, city governments worldwide have forcefully evicted and demolished informal communities in this pursuit. In such instances it would seem that the state has broken the social contract with its most vulnerable citizens. How do citizens respond? We might expect them to reciprocate in kind, by withholding taxes owed to the government. Using a survey of citizens living in informal settlements across Lagos State in Nigeria, we explore what predicts citizens' willingness to comply with government taxation. In this unlikely context for voluntary compliance, we observe that a third of respondents pay taxes and a majority are willing to pay absent enforcement. We find minimal support for standard theories of tax payment — trust in or reciprocity toward the government, or identification with the nation. Instead, we find that willingness to pay taxes is correlated with group membership, believing that community members respect taxpayers, and donating to the community. Our data suggest that local institutions and social relations are associated with citizens' willingness to comply with tax policy.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Volume 54, Issue 12, p. 2123-2154
ISSN: 1552-3829
How do major national events influence attitudes toward non-nationals? Recent research suggests that national sports team wins help foster national pride, weaken ethnic attachments, and build trust among conational out-group members. This paper asks a related question: By heightening nationalism, do these victories also affect attitudes toward foreign out-groups, specifically refugees? We examine this question using the 2019 Africa Cup football match between Kenya and Tanzania, which Kenya narrowly won, coupled with an online survey experiment conducted with a panel of 2,647 respondents recruited through Facebook. We find that winning increases national pride and preferences for resource allocation toward conationals, but it also leads to negative views of refugees' contribution to the country's diversity. However, we present experimental evidence that reframing national sports victories as a product of cooperation among diverse players and highlighting shared superordinate identities can offset these views and help foster positive attitudes toward refugees.
In: MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2016-25
SSRN
Working paper
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Volume 51, Issue 8, p. 979-1011
ISSN: 1552-3829
World Affairs Online
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Volume 51, Issue 8, p. 979-1011
ISSN: 1552-3829
Conflicting preferences between the state and society underpin most accountability mechanisms by providing a credible way for society to impose costs on the state. Adapting a classic bargaining framework, we argue that broader conditions can support state–society bargaining. Policies that both the state and society value can also enhance society's negotiating power, provided society has a relatively lower valuation and is more patient than the state. By threatening to sabotage their own interests but hurt the impatient state even more, citizens can compel the state to deliver broader policy benefits. We illustrate this logic with the case of polio vaccination in northern Nigeria, where entire communities have resisted the vaccine as a strategy to bargain for more desired services. To resolve and preempt noncompliance, the Nigerian government has enhanced service delivery in other areas, demonstrating the opportunity for improved accountability in the presence of shared-interest policies.
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Volume 142, p. 105379
In: Political behavior, Volume 42, Issue 3, p. 745-768
ISSN: 1573-6687