Search results

Preface: "modernity" and social science, beyond universal history -- The problem, the argument, and the study -- Institutions of work in theoretical and historical context : sources of variation in the course of industrialization -- Work, community, and authority in late-industrializing Japan : prewar "traditionalism" to postwar "syncretism" -- Work, community, and authority in late-industrializing Russia : socialist revolution and the "scientific organization of labor" -- Comparisons and implications

In this response to the contributions in this symposium, I approach the above articles not as wholesale critiques requiring point-by-point rebuttal but as constructive engagements that require clarification or invite further reflection as part of an ongoing conversation. In some instances, I revisit and elaborate upon the main motivations and assumptions that Peter Katzenstein and I had in mind as we sought to lay out the significance of analytic eclecticism for different audiences. At other times, I take it upon myself to consider aspects of our approach that might be updated or reframed in light of concerns raised by some of the authors. I specifically address four issues that have been raised: the core logic of analytic eclecticism and its operationalization with respect to once-dominant paradigms in International Relations; the link between complexity, causality, and constitutive logics; the status of metatheory and the links between eclecticism and pragmatism; and the relationship between scholarly debates and "real-world" issues of policy and ethics. Whether the response is satisfactory or not, it is worth bearing in mind that, for Peter Katzenstein and myself, analytic eclecticism was always meant to be more of an ethos than a method or manifesto; that ethos long predates our published work and is evident in the thoughtful contributions that constitute this symposium.

After the fall of communism, the restructuring of labor became an integral part of the larger project of building democracy and markets.

Stephen Hanson's (2008) essay in the Fall 2008 issue of this newsletter offers a much needed corrective for the perception that area-focused scholarship is neither rigorous enough nor theoretical enough to deserve a prominent place in the discipline of political science. While concurring with Hanson's eloquent defense of the value of area studies, this essay is motivated by a concern over just how we might facilitate the "open-minded and mutually respectful dialogue" that Hanson (2008: 41) calls for between area specialists and those who are more partial to general theories or deductive models. Below, I examine the prospects of getting such a dialogue off the ground in view of the prevailing methodological currents and epistemological divides in the discipline. I suggest that rival epistemological orientations not only drive the debates over the status of area studies, as Hanson suggests, but also generate quite different types of area-focused scholarship some of which have a better chance than others of productively engaging general comparativists in the discipline. To facilitate even this more narrowly circumscribed dialogue, which I view as a pre-condition for a wider conversation encompassing more varied perspectives, a useful mediating role can be played by cross-regional small-N comparison (as opposed to area-bound comparative studies or single-country studies).

The heated debates between proponents of rational-choice, culturalist, and structuralist (or historical institutionalist) analysis over method and substance derive from differences over philosophical issues. This article relates these differences between ideal-typical rationalist, culturalist and structuralist analysis to their positions on two fundamental problems in social theory: (i) the epistemological significance of structural principles vis-a-vis agency; and (ii) the relative significance of the material and ideal dimensions of social processes. This suggests that many recent efforts at `synthesis' (e.g. through `analytic narratives') end up being rhetorical gestures since the fundamental assumptions identified with a given approach are not significantly relaxed. A more pragmatic position has been outlined in `structurationist' perspectives that build on Weber's social theory. Such perspectives are consciously agnostic about epistemological first principles in order to permit more question-driven analysis. Structurationism does not represent a novel paradigm for comparative analysis, but its epistemological flexibility makes it an ideal foundation for eclectic scholarship intended to transcend and engage the debates among rationalist, culturalist, and structuralist analysis.

The heated debates between proponents of rational-choice, culturalist, & structuralist (or historical institutionalist) analysis over method & substance derive from differences over philosophical issues. This article relates these differences between ideal-typical rationalist, culturalist, & structuralist analysis to their positions on two fundamental problems in social theory: (1) the epistemological significance of structural principles vis-a-vis agency; & (2) the relative significance of the material & ideal dimensions of social processes. This suggests that many recent efforts at 'synthesis' (eg, through 'analytic narratives') end up being rhetorical gestures, since the fundamental assumptions identified with a given approach are not significantly relaxed. A more pragmatic position has been outlined in 'structurationist' perspectives that build on Weber's social theory. Such perspectives are consciously agnostic about epistemological first principles in order to permit more question-driven analysis. Structurationism does not represent a novel paradigm for comparative analysis, but its epistemological flexibility makes it an ideal foundation for eclectic scholarship intended to transcend & engage the debates among rationalist, culturalist, & structuralist analysis. 1 Figure, 46 References. Adapted from the source document.

Since contending methodological perspectives & different types of research products are founded on irreconcilable philosophical assumptions, the sharp, recurrent debates over social science research methods are likely to be fruitless & counterproductive. This article begins by exposing some of the philosophical assumptions underlying the most recent calls for a unified social science methodology & seeks to help develop a common appreciation of how different kinds of methods & research products advance our understanding of different aspects of social life at different levels of abstraction. Such commonly posited dichotomies as deductivist/inductivist logic, quantitative/quantitative analysis, & nomothetic/idiographic research products are shown to obscure significant differences along a continuum of strategies through which context-bound information & analytic constructs are combined to produce interpretations of varying degrees of complexity or generality. Durkheim's conception of "organic solidarity" in a social "division of labor" serves as a useful metaphor here to capture the complementary roles performed by various research products as well as the trade-offs arising from the strengths & weaknesses of various methodological approaches (ranging from formal & statistical approaches to various case-based & interpretive approaches). Thus, sharp claims regarding the strengths & limitations of particular methods are transformed into elements of an overarching agnostic understanding of the trade-offs & complementarities among these methods. Finally, a distinctive role is identified for an ideal-typical "middle-range" comparative-historical approach in fostering greater communication among a more inclusively defined community of methodologically diverse social scientists. 2 Figures. Adapted from the source document.