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Whether international crises end in conflict frequently depends on the information that leaders possess. To better explain how leaders acquire information, I develop and test an informational theory of bureaucracies during crises. Time-constrained leaders delegate information collection to advisers who lead bureaucracies. A division of labor between bureaucracies breeds comparative specialization among advisers. Some emphasize information on adversaries' political attributes, which are harder to assess; others stress military attributes, which are easier to assess. Bureaucratic role thus affects the content and uncertainty that advisers provide. I use automated and qualitative coding to measure adviser input in 5,400 texts from US Cold War crises. As hypothesized, advisers' positions affect the information and uncertainty they convey but not the policies they promote as canonical theories suggest. For individuals advising leaders during crises, what you know depends on where you sit. Consequently, the information leaders possess hinges on which bureaucracies have their attention.

Scholars typically associate leader turnover with a high risk of military conflict. This article shows that under some conditions, a higher likelihood of leader turnover in the future fosters peace today. When states take costly peaceful measures (e.g., arming to deter adversaries), the range of settlements preferable to war shrinks and the risk of conflict rises. If peace costs are onerous, potential leader turnover in adversaries promotes peace by introducing uncertainty about the future need for and costs of deterrent measures. When locked in a costly peace with minimal chance of leader turnover in the adversary, states attack. When locked in that same costly peace but with high prospects for leader turnover, states endure an unfavorable peace today given the potential for a favorable one tomorrow. Asymmetric consequences of future shifts in peace costs ensure the relationship holds even if costs do not change in expectation and could rise. Quantitative analyses of the prospects for future leader turnover, military spending, and war initiation among rivals accord with the hypothesized relationships. In theory and practice, expectations of leadership volatility make it prudent to exercise peaceful forbearance.

Scholars have long recognized that imminent shifts in relative power may motivate declining states to initiate conflict. But what conditions exacerbate the risk posed by these anticipated power shifts? Building upon existing bargaining models of war, I show that larger initial power asymmetries increase the probability of preventive conflict. Theoretical extensions that account for certainty effects and variable costs of war, both of which are linked to initial dyadic power balances, drive this relationship. It follows that looming power transitions in which rising states approach and surpass parity, long considered war-prone scenarios, are not particularly problematic. Instead, the risk of conflict is greatest when preponderant powers confront conventionally weak but rising states. I test the theoretical predictions in the context of anticipated power shifts due to rivals pursuing nuclear weapons. Extensive empirical tests that relax assumptions employed in prior analyses of preventive conflict offer strong support for this contention. These results shed light on the underpinnings of many pressing contemporary interstate security issues.

Scholars have long recognized that imminent shifts in relative power may motivate declining states to initiate conflict. But what conditions exacerbate the risk posed by these anticipated power shifts? Building upon existing bargaining models of war, I show that larger initial power asymmetries increase the probability of preventive conflict. Theoretical extensions that account for certainty effects and variable costs of war, both of which are linked to initial dyadic power balances, drive this relationship. It follows that looming power transitions in which rising states approach and surpass parity, long considered war-prone scenarios, are not particularly problematic. Instead, the risk of conflict is greatest when preponderant powers confront conventionally weak but rising states. I test the theoretical predictions in the context of anticipated power shifts due to rivals pursuing nuclear weapons. Extensive empirical tests that relax assumptions employed in prior analyses of preventive conflict offer strong support for this contention. These results shed light on the underpinnings of many pressing contemporary interstate security issues.

AbstractHow does the design of military institutions affect who bears the costs of war? We answer this question by studying the transformative shift from segregated to integrated US military units during the Korean War. Combining new micro-level data on combat fatalities with archival data on the deployment and racial composition of military battalions, we show that Black and white soldiers died at similar rates under segregation. Qualitative and quantitative evidence provides one potential explanation for this counterintuitive null finding: acute battlefield concerns necessitated deploying military units wherever soldiers were needed, regardless of their race. We next argue that the mid-war racial integration of units, which tied the fates of soldiers more closely together, should not alter the relative fatality rates. The evidence is consistent with this expectation. Finally, while aggregate fatality rates were equal across races, segregation enabled short-term casualty discrepancies. Under segregation there were high casualty periods for white units followed by high casualty periods for Black units. Integration eliminated this variability. This research note highlights how enshrining segregationist policies within militaries creates permissive conditions for either commanders' choices, or the dictates and variability of conflict, to shape who bears war's costs.

Alliances are costly to form and to terminate, and yet alliances change frequently. Scholars typically attribute these decisions to static factors, such as the power balance, and retrospective ones, such as past power shifts. We highlight another factor: prospective changes, particularly anticipated military strength shifts. We analyze a three-country bargaining model of alliances and war that incorporates forward-looking power dynamics. The model, unlike those restricting players to set roles, flexibly allows players to ally in any arrangement. We find that alliance arrangements that are optimal when power is static are often suboptimal when power fluctuates. Maintaining prior alliances despite expected power shifts may even lead to preventive war. States thus strategically look to the future to identify optimal alliances in the present. Quantitative analyses corroborate the expectation. As the anticipated size of power shifts increases, alliance changes become more common. Accordingly, states navigate expected changes in the international landscape by rearranging current alliance commitments that can help minimize the risk of conflict. When power balances are in flux, malleable institutional arrangements may prove preferable to rigid ones.

How do leaders' statements about conflict duration affect public support for their handling of war? We build on two disparate strands of prior research to theorize how approval depends on perceptions of both war's expected value and of the leader themself. The information available for making these evaluations changes over time. The public relies on elite cues in early stages of war. Cues predicting a short conflict mobilize support. As conflict unfolds, the actual conditions provide information about the accuracy of earlier statements, while subsequent messages provide information about the consistency of these statements. Both allow the public to learn about the leader. Inaccuracy and inconsistency negatively affect evaluations of the leader and reduce support for war. Using a panel survey experiment to test these predictions, we find that public approval is highest when (1) the leader initially predicts a short conflict and (2) when initial predictions prove accurate. The results reveal an intertemporal tradeoff for leaders. Predicting a short conflict is optimal for mobilizing support but potentially suboptimal for retaining that support.

"The Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Uncertainty and Conflict in International Relations" published on by Oxford University Press.

Does a shock to the balance of power cause the advantaged actor to exploit its newfound advantage by initiating conflict? The modeling literature on commitment problems as a source of war makes a central assumption that states know and anticipate power shifts. We relax this assumption such that states must estimate future power shifts by looking at past and present capabilities—both their own and those of their adversaries. We incorporate these estimates, and their attendant uncertainty, into a model of war. We find that commitment problems remain a source of war, but that the existing models overpredict war by ignoring this dynamic. States continuously updating their estimates and accounting for uncertainty promotes peace. It follows that the apparent window of opportunity—in which the power balance becomes suddenly favorable to one side—poses less of a threat to peace than previous theories suggest. This result has applications to nuclear proliferation dynamics and conflict in general. We find empirical support for the model in tests analyzing power shifts and interstate wars.

In canonical accounts of war, conflict outcomes are inherently uncertain. Contesting literatures posit that this uncertainty, arising from stochastic elements of the war-fighting process, may induce conflict due to greater risks of miscalculation or foster peace by breeding caution. We theorize that states, on average, exhibit prudence when confronting greater uncertainty. Despite its conceptual importance, extant proxies for uncertainty at various levels of analysis—such as polarity, balance of power, system concentration, and dyadic relative capabilities—are imprecise and theoretically inappropriate indicators. To overcome this shortcoming, we theorize the conditions that elevate the magnitude of uncertainty over conflict outcomes and introduce a novel measure that captures this uncertainty within any k-state system. Through extensive empirical analysis, we confirm uncertainty's pacifying effect and show how this effect operates at different levels of analysis.