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This article investigates the long-neglected influence of the European Parliament (EP) in the field of free movement of persons and the abolishment of border controls in the European Community (EC). Since the immediate post-war period, parliamentarians lobbied for a new mobility regime in Europe. In the early years, this was mainly done in the Council of Europe's (then) Consultative Assembly, before the EC's fora became more important. By trying to abolish visas, border formalities and controls, the parliamentarians spearheaded initiatives that some member states were also pursuing. The Council's decision in 1975 to introduce a common format passport was a decisive step and after the direct elections to the EP in 1979, the activism in this field gained traction. Particularly a trio of German members (Karl von Wogau, Dieter Rogalla and Horst Seefeld) and the so-called Kangaroo Group developed effective strategies to spread their ideas and influence policy by including regional, national and supra-national actors as well as their parties and groups in the EP. The years 1981-1984 brought essential changes and lead to the Schengen Agreement in 1985, in which the EP's role has long been neglected.

On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Between August 1982 and February 1984, the US, France, Britain and Italy deployed a Multinational Force (MNF) to Beirut. Its task was to act as an interposition force to bolster the government and to bring peace to the people. The mission is often forgotten or merely remembered in context with the bombing of US Marines' barracks. However, an analysis of the Italian contingent shows that the MNF was not doomed to fail and could accomplish its task when operational and diplomatic efforts were coordinated. The Italian commander in Beirut, General Franco Angioni, followed a successful approach that sustained neutrality, respectful behaviour and minimal force, which resulted in a qualified success of the Italian efforts.

Over the last two decades, Amedeo Guillet (1909–2010) has been turned into a public and military hero. His exploits as a guerrilla leader in Italian East Africa in 1941 have been exaggerated to forge a narrative of an honourable resistance against overwhelming odds. Thereby, Guillet has been showcased as a romanticized colonial explorer who was an apolitical and timeless Italian officer. He has been compared to Lawrence of Arabia in order to raise his international visibility, while his genuine Italian brand is perpetuated domestically. By elevating him to an official role model, the Italian Army has gained a focal point for military heroism that was also acceptable in the public memory as the embodiment of a 'glorious' defeat narrative.

After the Civil War the Spanish army functioned as a guardian of domestic order, but suffered from antiquated material and little financial means. These factors have been described as fundamental reasons for the army's low potential wartime capability. This article draws on British and German sources to demonstrate how Spanish military culture prevented an augmented effectiveness and organisational change. Claiming that the army merely lacked funding and modern equipment, falls considerably short in grasping the complexities of military effectiveness and organisational cultures, and might prove fatal for current attempts to develop foreign armed forces in conflict or post-conflict zones.

After the Second World War, a new Austrian Army (the Bundesheer) was formed to guarantee the country's armed neutrality. But the period between 1938 and 1945 remained a point of contention. While some Austrian officers had been sidelined, the majority had served in the Wehrmacht and thus shared experiences and soldierly values. As Cold War realities necessitated a professional experienced army, a group around Erwin Fussenegger (1908–1986) dominated the new Bundesheer and contemplations about reforming the military culture and value system were postponed; while at the same time, the Bundesheer managed to prevent becoming a mere continuation of the Wehrmacht.