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Does declining voter turnout harm center-left parties? Although this is what many observers believe, most empirical studies fail to support this thesis. In contrast to this common wisdom, this article shows that there is a negative effect of turnout decline on the Social Democratic Party and the Left Party in Germany. For the first time, this article analyzes systematically aggregate data of 1,500 urban quarters in 34 large German cities. It will be argued that the effects of social segregation and voter apathy become only visible on this small scale since social indicators and turnout data correlate very highly. Urban districts differ not only in their electoral participation but also in the election results. Left of center parties fare much better in areas that have experienced the strongest decline of turnout over the last three decades. Adapted from the source document.

Germany's two main parties are facing a crisis. While this seems obvious with regard to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), it also holds true for the Christian Democrats (CDU). Reforming the welfare state proves to be a highly contentious endeavor for either party, mainly due to large segments of the population supporting its preservation. Recent election results mirror the broad opposition to welfare retrenchment: CDU & SPD -- once the architects of the German welfare state, but now perceived to dismantle it -- have done poorly, whereas smaller parties scored well. Based on all state (Linder) & federal elections since 1990, the development of the German party system & coalition building on both levels are being examined. It can be shown that Social Democrats -- in spite of currently low public support -- have moved to the center of the German party system. Currently, with five parliamentary parties in the Bundestag, the SPD is strategically better placed than Christian Democrats, due to a higher number of conceivable coalition partners. Moreover, opinion polls indicate that a majority of voters favor remodeling the German welfare state according to the Scandinavian model to further cuts. Tables, Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The open method of co-ordination (OMC) has received much attention in the recent EU literature. The predominant view claims that the OMC is not only a new but also an effective policy-making instrument. This paper raises doubts about both claims by offering a comparison of soft law policy co-ordination in three international organizations. More specifically, this paper compares the European Employment Strategy to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the EU, the OECD Economic Surveys, & the IMF Article IV Consultations. Based on expert interviews, it seeks to demonstrate that these procedures are forms of multilateral surveillance that do not differ in kind. Such a comparative analysis of the OMC refutes claims to its novelty. Having compared the four procedures, a more general model of multilateral surveillance consisting of six elements is generated that facilitates further comparisons. This paper concludes that governments select voluntarist procedures mainly to secure their own competencies rather than to realize common goals. Effective problem-solving is therefore not necessarily the dominant objective of soft law. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

It is often noted that if the European Union itself were to apply for EU membership, it would not be allowed to enter since it does not meet the democratic standards mandatory for accession states. However, for many researchers it seems less clear whether the EU could be or even should be democratized. We can identify four positions with respect to the probability & the desirability of EU democratization: Optimists, Pessimists, Apologists, & Fatalists. The first part of the paper attributes scholars to each of these four positions & explains their views on EU democracy in detail. The second part tests the plausibility of each position empirically. This exercise highlights the current dilemma of European integration. The EU can no longer proceed as an "elites only" project, but the EU also lacks the preconditions for full democratization. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

In recent years, the thesis has been presented that, given output-oriented legitimacy, the European Union does not exhibit a democratic deficit. Rather, tasks & competencies are shifted to the supranational level in order to enhance the ability of the political system to solve problems. Institutions that are not directly democratically legitimated allow for Pareto improvements, where this is otherwise neither achieved by the market nor in negotiation processes. This article criticizes this thesis & demonstrates that the democratic deficit of the EU lies in the de-politicization of politics. The delegation of decisions is only unproblematic when the point of departure can be recognized as fair, actors have no interest in relative gain, the reach of delegated decisions is able to be contained & decisions in cases of shifts in the majority remain reversible. In the EU these conditions are frequently not met. Where decisions are controversial, procedures must be found that ensure an appropriate representation of diverse interests. Adapted from the source document.

This article analyzes the social potential of regional integration processes by using the example of European integration. Recent case law from the European Court of Justice has led some observers to argue that judicial decisions increasingly provide European politics with a "Polanyian" drive. We test this claim by distinguishing three dimensions to European economic and social integration: market-restricting integration, market-enforcing integration, and the creation of a European area of nondiscrimination. We also identify two forms of integration that have different speeds, scopes, and potentials: political integration and judicial integration. The evidence shows that the EU has come closer to Hayek's vision of "interstate federalism" than is usually warranted because market-enforcing integration and European nondiscrimination policies have asymmetrically profited from "integration through law." The opportunities for international courts to push ahead market-enforcing integration increase as the participants of regional integration processes become more diverse. In such "Hayekian" constellations, individual rights are increasingly relocated to the central level, at the cost of subordinating the decentralized capacity for solidarity and interpersonal redistribution. Adapted from the source document.