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We disentangle the contribution of unobserved heterogeneity in demand and productivity to firm growth using Italian data containing unique information on firm‐level prices. Demand and total factor productivity (TFP) shocks are equally important in shaping firm growth. However, the pass‐through of shocks to growth is highly incomplete, more so for productivity shocks. We argue that incompleteness and asymmetry of the pass‐through can be explained by frictions that, unlike those studied by the literature on factor misallocation, have differential effects according to the nature of the shock. We propose hurdles to firms' ability to reorganize as an example of these types of frictions.

In firms with concentrated ownership the controlling shareholder may pursue nonmonetary private returns, such as electoral goals in a firm controlled by politicians or family prestige in family firms. We use a simple theoretical model to analyze how this mechanism affects the selection of executives and, through this, the firm's productivity compared to a benchmark where the owner only cares about the value of the firm. We discuss identification and derive two structural estimates of the model, based on different sample moments. The estimates, based on a matched employer–employee data set of Italian firms, suggest that private returns are larger in family- and government-controlled firms than in firms controlled by a conglomerate or by a foreign entity. The resulting distortion in executive selection can account for total factor productivity differentials between control types of up to 10%.

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation which forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm-bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 16 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment and sales.

Abstract
Using data on bank-firm relationships in Italy during the Eurozone financial crisis, we show that: (i) compared to healthy banks, under-capitalised banks cut credit to healthy but not to zombie firms and are more likely to prolong a credit relationship with a zombie; (ii) in area sectors with more low-capital banks, zombies are more likely to survive; (iii) bank under-capitalisation does not hurt the growth rate of healthy firms. We provide evidence that extending credit to the weakest firms during the recession mitigated the disruption of supply chains and adverse local demand externalities.