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Das Buch führt erstmals Ansätze aus der Wahlverhaltens-, der Parteien- wie auch der Medienwirkungsforschung zusammen. Über die Entwicklung eines aus der sozialpsychologischen und soziologischen Forschung abgeleiteten Framing-Modells mit dem Frame "Ideologie" gelingt es dem Buch, theoretische Erkenntnisse aus den unterschiedlichen Fachbereichen konsistent zu verknüpfen und sie entscheidend weiter zu entwickeln. Anschließend wird das Modell empirisch am Fallbeispiel der ideologischen Verortung der SPD zwischen 1998 und 2005 anhand von quantitativen Primär- und Sekundärdaten überprüft. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Framing durch Medien und Parteien (fast) keinen Effekt auf die SPD-Wahrnehmung der Wähler hatte

Under what conditions do threat perceptions lead to an increasing distrust in government? This article argues that the answer is the degree of ease with which a perceived threat can be linked to governmental actors. First, I argue that threats directed toward society should be more easily linked by citizens to the domestic government compared to perceived threats to the individual (general linkage). Second, a threat linked to a citizen's general political stance more strongly affects their attitude toward governmental actors in negative ways (heuristic linkage). Third, I expect threat perceptions to further increase governmental distrust if the latter's actors are blamed for a perceived threat that is salient to citizens' ideological worldviews (blame attribution). Empirical tests using self-administered survey- and experimental data corroborate the argument. In closing I discuss the implications of the theoretical and empirical setup, emphasizing the need for future studies on blame attribution, heuristic linkages, and political trust.

Descriptive studies on the European Union's global image reveal generally favourable feelings towards the European Union on the part of citizens outside Europe. However, European Union perceptions vary considerably across countries. This article argues that these patterns can be analytically explained by taking context and individual factors into account. European Union behaviour and an individual's supranationalist attitude should exert a substantial impact on citizens' feelings. A multi-level model confirms the expectations. These findings imply practically that the behaviour of the European Union and other International Organizations shapes public opinion and that it might, in the future, negatively influence global public opinion towards the European Union.

Descriptive studies on the European Union's global image reveal generally favourable feelings towards the European Union on the part of citizens outside Europe. However, European Union perceptions vary considerably across countries. This article argues that these patterns can be analytically explained by taking context and individual factors into account. European Union behaviour and an individual's supranationalist attitude should exert a substantial impact on citizens' feelings. A multi-level model confirms the expect- ations. These findings imply practically that the behaviour of the European Union and other International Organizations shapes public opinion and that it might, in the future, negatively influence global public opinion towards the European Union. ; peerReviewed

"In den letzten Jahren haben mehr und mehr gesellschaftliche AkteurInnen die sinkende Demokratiezufriedenheit in Österreich beklagt und dafür vornehmlich das sinkende Vertrauen in die politischen, als korrupt und unfähig wahrgenommenen AkteurInnen als Ursache ausgemacht. Dieser Artikel überprüft diese Annahme anhand klassischer theoretischer Literatur aus der Politischen Kulturforschung sowie der quantitativen Datensätze des European Social Survey 2002-2008 und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass diese grundlegende Annahme infrage gestellt werden muss. Weder sinkt die Demokratiezufriedenheit in Österreich über die Messzeitpunkte hinweg in einem signifikanten Ausmaß, noch lässt sich die individuelle Demokratiezufriedenheit vornehmlich über das Vertrauen in die individuellen PolitikerInnen erklären." (Autorenreferat)

In recent years, more and more civil society actors have lamented over the decline of satisfaction with democracy in Austria, and have attributed this decline most prominently to the decline of trust in individual political actors, which are perceived as corrupt and scandal-laden. This article examines that assumption by discussing fundamental literature in Political Culture research and by testing hypotheses derived from the discussion with data sets from the European Social Survey 2002-2008. It concludes that the assumption should be challenged as the aggregate satisfaction with democracy does not decline significantly over the years and as individual satisfaction with democracy cannot be explained predominantly by citizens' trust in individual political actors. Adapted from the source document.