Convertible securities and venture capital finance
In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 217
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In: Working paper series Center for Economic Studies ; Ifo Institute ; 217
In: Discussion paper No. 480
In: Discussion paper 430
In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Volume 28, Issue 6, p. 595-614
ISSN: 1470-1316
In seiner Thünen-Vorlesung vor dem Verein für Socialpolitik im Herbst 2020 hat Klaus Schmidt das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen untersucht. Er geht dabei von einem Vorschlag Martin Weitzmans aus, künftige Verhandlungen auf einen einheitlichen CO2-Mindestpreis zu fokussieren. Wäre ein solches Vorgehen demjenigen, wie es in den Abkommen von Paris und Kyoto praktiziert wurde, tatsächlich überlegen? Schmidt berichtet von zwei experimentellen Studien, in denen er gemeinsam mit Koautoren Licht auf diese Frage geworfen hat. Die Ergebnisse beider Studien unterstützen den Vorschlag von Weitzman.
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In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Volume 20, Issue 3, p. 289-299
ISSN: 1470-1316
In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Volume 17, Issue 5, p. 675-680
ISSN: 1470-1316
In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Volume 15, Issue 1, p. 85-89
ISSN: 1470-1316
Technological standards give rise to a complements problem that affects pricing and innovation incentives of technology producers. In this paper I discuss how patent pools can be used to solve these problems and what incentives patent holders have to form a patent pool. I offer some suggestions how competition authorities can foster the formation of welfare increasing patent pools.
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In: The European legacy: the official journal of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas (ISSEI), Volume 14, Issue 3, p. 329-332
ISSN: 1470-1316
In: The Law and Economics of Creditor Protection, p. 87-92
In: Discussion paper 440
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Volume 132, Issue 648, p. 2992-3019
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
Carbon prices are the most cost-effective instrument to reduce CO$_2$ emissions, but there is strong political opposition to raising them to the efficient level. Therefore, additional efforts of consumers, firms and local governments are required. We study how different regulatory regimes affect moral behaviour and show that a carbon tax complements voluntary efforts to reduce emissions, while cap and trade discourages them. The opportunity to invest in offsets increases welfare, while the option to buy and delete emission rights induces more emissions and reduces welfare. Furthermore, cap and trade shifts the burden of adjustment to poor consumers and has dysfunctional incentive effects.
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16985
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