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In a parsimonious model of a collective decision problem with partially conflicting interests, we show that restricting communication may enhance decision quality. If disclosed information is observed by decision makers with different preferences, individuals may strategically withhold information. In this case, a committee member's silence arouses the other members' suspicions. As a consequence, in case of residual uncertainty, individual votes may react less to information that is publicly observed. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis paper analyzes liability rules when consumers and third parties/the environment incur harm. Expected harm is convex in the level of output and modeled as a power function. We show that the social ranking of liability rules previously established for the case in which only consumers suffer harm (Strict Liability dominates No Liability and Negligence) may be reversed if harm to third parties or the environment is sufficiently important.

This is a survey on the recent game theoretic literature on committee decision making. We consider theoretical work on the role of (i) strategic voting, (ii) costly information acquisition, (iii) conflicting interests, & (iv) communication in committees. Moreover, we review recent experimental evidence on these issues. Our analysis focuses on the optimal size, composition, & decision rules of committees. We also finally discuss implications for the design of monetary policy committees. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]