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This paper examines the possibility of a domestic producer evading taxes and duties by misstating the price of an imported intermediate good. In a qualitative response model it is shown that goverment's revenue maximizing behavior implies a detection function which depends positively on the amount of misdeclaration. As a consequence there exists, for every combination of (linear) import tariff and (linear) income tax, a unique declared price of the imported good which maximizes the expected (true, but not declared) profit. Whether under- or overdeclaration is optimal depends on the relative magnitudes of tax and tariff rates, whereas the amount of misdeclaration is determined by the specification of the detection function and the form of punishment.

The paper addresses the question whether voters would favor a restriction on capital exports to the East, and if so, to what extent. In a two country framework, it is shown that an unrestricted capital outflow is not optimal, in the traditional sense of a social welfare maximizing benevolent dictator. Furthermore, capital export may lead to unemployment and a loss of output in the exporting country if a minimum wage constraint comes into effect. Nevertheless, it may still be optimal to encounter a certain loss in employment and production because of a positive factor terms of trade effect. The preferences of individuals who are differently endowed with 'capital and labor depend on their endowment ratio: E.g., an individual whose capital-labor endowment ratio exceeds the figure for the economy will prefer less-than-optimal curbing of capital outflow. If the policy concerning capital exports is decided upon via majority voting, it is the median voter's optimal policy that is finally adopted. This implies that the restriction on capital exports would presumably be tighter than in the traditional understanding of a benevolent dictator.

Traditional explanations for the existence of barter trade have only very limited explanatory power. In particular, barter trade can neither overcome liquidity shortages nor make up for marketing deficiencies. It is argued that barter trade makes sense only in the presence of interventions in national and international markets. Owing to its opaque and selective character, this archaic and highly inefficient form of trade enables a certain degree of flexibility in rigid situations to be regained which are maintained for various political reasons. Barter trade may help to unload surplus production, caused by domestic price controls; it can act as a selective devaluation, when the domestic currency is overvalued and windfall profits can be obtained via barter by underpricing of a cartel's official price. Finally, barter trade enables the evasion of taxes and tariff liabilities. Hence it follows that this form of trade may be regarded attractive for decision-makers, given the underlying distortions as a parameter.

Die Corona-Pandemie hat unser aller Leben einschneidend verändert. Wir sind Zeugen eines multiplen Systemschocks – Schwächen und Verwundbarkeiten wurden auf vielen Ebenen bloßgelegt. Was bleibt von der Krise und ihren tief greifenden Veränderungen? Stellt sie eine Zeitenwende dar oder ist sie nur eine Delle in langfristigen Trendlinien? Wie wird Corona unsere Lebenswelten in Familie, Arbeit, Schule, Wirtschaft, Politik, Kultur und Wissenschaft dauerhaft verändern? Auf diese Fragen geben 32 renommierte Wissenschaftler*innen aus allen Bereichen Antworten, pointiert und kenntnisreich. Diese schlaglichtartigen Kurzanalysen fügen sich zu einem Kaleidoskop und geben den Blick frei auf die Welt nach Corona.

"Inhalt / Contents" -- "Guest Editorial: Special Issue on Corruption at the Grassroots-level What Can We Know About Corruption?" -- "Abhandlungen/Original Papers" -- "Corruption and Productivity: Firm-level Evidence" -- "Bribing Behaviour and Sample Selection: Evidence from Post-Socialist Countries and Western Europe" -- "Determinants of Willingness to Bribe: Micro Evidence from the Educational Sector in China" -- "Religious Loyalty and Acceptance of Corruption" -- "Group Decision Making in a Corruption Experiment: China and Germany Compared

AbstractWe analyze the differences in the socioeconomic profiles between suicide terrorists and 'regular' militants using a dataset of 1596 militants (including 209 suicide terrorists) from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). We find that suicide terrorists are better educated, younger, less likely to be married or have children, and less likely to live in the Gaza strip than their non-suicide counterparts. Moreover, although the profiles of Hamas and PIJ militants are distinctively different, the suicide terrorists are very similar to one another.