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Dealing with general economic theory, other than employment theory, the book discusses the theory of pure and monopolistic competition - with a special emphasis upon welfare aspects. Beginning with an analysis of the consumer and of the individual firm, the main stress is nevertheless placed on the analysis of the economic system as a whole

The volume is divided into three parts:A: Economic Growth and Related Problems (covering international trade and economic integration, including a comparative study between Europe and America)B: Theoretical Welfare Economics (welfare propositions in economics, profit maximization and its implications and the Theory of Tariffs)C: Practical Welfare Economics (the price of economic progress, equity and international payments)

The union of Western Europe poses many complex and technical obstacles. Analysing the advantages as well as the difficulties, the book discusses competition and the nature and direction of the increased pressures it brings to bear upon entrepreneurial activity, through which the effects of economic union will mostly be felt

Dealing with general economic theory, other than employment theory, the book discusses the theory of pure and monopolistic competition - with a special emphasis upon welfare aspects. Beginning with an analysis of the consumer and of the individual firm, the main stress is nevertheless placed on the analysis of the economic system as a whole.

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)