Noncomparable poverty comparisons
In: The journal of development studies, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 523-536
ISSN: 1743-9140
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In: The journal of development studies, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 523-536
ISSN: 1743-9140
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of development studies, Volume 54, Issue 3, p. 523-536
ISSN: 1743-9140
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, p. 1-14
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7373
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Working paper
In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7528
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Working paper
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Volume 127, p. 1-20
World Affairs Online
As the Arab Spring unfolded and political unrest spread across the Arab world, Jordan faced an adverse economy as well. Fundamental to the economic challenge was high and rising energy prices, already heavily subsidized for consumers. With the government intent on staving off emerging political unrest through a series of measures, buffering consumers from increased energy prices being a key action, fiscal costs mounted. By 2012, subsidies on petroleum products alone were about 2.8 percent of GDP and 8.8 percent of government expenditures. At the same time, political unrest disrupted the supply of natural gas from Egypt and Jordan abruptly had to switch to using imported oil products (heavy fuel oil and diesel) to produce electricity. Consequently, the cost of producing electricity increased several folds. As the increased cost was not passed on to the consumers, National Electric Power company (NEPCO), bore all the increases in fuel prices and accumulate debt as a result. At approximately 17 percent of government expenditures and 5.5 percent of GDP in 2011, this was twice the amount of the petroleum subsidies. The chapter is organized as follows. Section two traces the evolution of subsidies in Jordan in recent times. The distributional impacts of reform would depend on how important the subsidized items are to consumers in terms of their expenditures on those items. Section three discusses this question from the perspective of richer and poorer households. The distributional impacts of reform would of course not only depend on how much consumers spend on the subsidized items but also on the extent of price changes. Sections four and five simulate direct and indirect impacts of potential reform scenarios across the income distribution. From this discussion, in section six the chapter moves onto considering how reforms are weighed down by vexing political economy constraints. In MENA countries, universal subsidies have been in place as part of the government's role in ensuring stability in the lives of the people and doing away with them is not straightforward.
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Facing a fiscal crisis, Jordan initiated substantial petroleum subsidy reforms in 2012. The government has also long contemplated how to cut electricity subsidies, which surpass the fiscal burdens imposed by the petroleum subsidies. This paper estimates the impacts of the 2012 petroleum subsidies reform on household welfare and government revenues. It also simulates the distributional and fiscal impacts from ending subsidies in the electricity sector, where the pricing structure is more complex than petroleum prices. The paper looks at the direct and indirect impacts of reform. Moreover, the paper discusses the political economy considerations of reform. While the full removal of petroleum subsidies would have increased poverty, the compensatory cash transfer program the government instituted is estimated to have fully offset the negative impact for the poorer population. The impact of reforms in the electricity sector will depend significantly on the implementation method chosen. A flat increase of tariffs toward cost recovery will put a huge burden on the poorest households. However, a progressive increase in tariffs will generate substantial savings for the government, even with compensatory mechanisms to mitigate the strong negative impact on the vulnerable population. The immediate compensation of the losers from reform appears to be a crucial factor in the successful implementation of reforms in Jordan.
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In: What Works for the Poorest?, p. 23-44
In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7313
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Working paper
In: Forthcoming with Oxford Economic Papers
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In: Policy Research Working Paper, 7043
World Affairs Online
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16892
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7951
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In: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7043
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