Search results

Political bureaucracies make the overwhelming majority of public policy decisions in the United States. To examine the extent to which these agency actions are responsive to the preferences of elected officials, in particular, Congress, I develop a spatial model of oversight. The most important insight of this theory is that agencies make policy decisions within givenregimesand may be constrained by the preferences of different political actors at different times. To test the theory, I collect and analyze data on the monitoring activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). I find that under certain conditions, the FDA is responsive to the preferences of committees and floors in Congress, but under other conditions the agency can act autonomously.

Judicial review of agency decisions clearly affects policy outcomes, both because the courts can overrule an agency's decision and because the threat of judicial review can affect the agency's choice of policy. At the same time, however, judicial review does not simply `exist', but rather is a political variable that a legislature can use to affect policy outcomes. This paper explores how a legislature can use judicial review to influence policy outcomes and examines how review can affect the utility received by each actor. The game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that (1) legislatures can use judicial review strategically in order to obtain more-preferred outcomes, (2) a legislature's ability to improve policy outcomes through the strategic employment of judicial review is not wholly dependent on its ability to respond to the judiciary's actions (i.e. on having the last move in the policy game), and (3) the judiciary's type (i.e. the extent to which it acts restrained) influences outcomes and the actions of the legislature. Finally, I examine the design of judicial review in environmental policy to illustrate and support the theory.

Judicial review of agency decisions clearly affects policy outcomes, both because the courts can overrule an agency's decision & because the threat of judicial review can affect the agency's choice of policy. At the same time, however, judicial review does not simply 'exist', but rather is a political variable that a legislature can use to affect policy outcomes. This paper explores how a legislature can use judicial review to influence policy outcomes & examines how review can affect the utility received by each actor. The game-theoretic analysis demonstrates that (1) legislatures can use judicial review strategically in order to obtain more-preferred outcomes, (2) a legislature's ability to improve policy outcomes through the strategic employment of judicial review is not wholly dependent on its ability to respond to the judiciary's actions (ie, on having the last move in the policy game), & (3) the judiciary's type (ie, the extent to which it acts restrained) influences outcomes & the actions of the legislature. Finally, I examine the design of judicial review in environmental policy to illustrate & support the theory. 2 Tables, 4 Figures, 1 Appendix, 82 References. Adapted from the source document.