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This article describes the mechanisms of formation of political elites that led to their ascension to the highest tier of the power hierarchy in post-Soviet Georgia. In work, in the process of theoretical analysis, drawing on empirical material, thematically describes the mechanisms of formation and recruitment of elites in example 4 of the ruling political elites, mobilized, and consolidated around, Z. Gamsakhurdia, Е. Shevardnadze, М. Saakashvili and nicknamed the "informal leader" of Georgia B. Ivanishvili. These ruling political elites differed from each other in terms of ideological and value orientations defining different paths of a hierarchical ascent to the highest stages of power structures of the modern independent Georgia. This article uses two-level form of analysis. In the first case, attention is paid to theoretical aspects of mechanisms of change of government, such as elections and saturated with elements of the coup, a revolution. In the second case, the focus has shifted to the synthesis of theoretical components and the study of empirical and factual issues of this material. The paper also contains an analysis of the factors that contributed to the formation of counter-elite in opposition to the ruling political elite. Also describes the patterns of political behavior that are counter-elite used to gain power. In the process of climbing the political forces irreconcilable opposition to the highest level of the political hierarchy, they often went beyond the permissible scope of legal and constitutional norms, achieving their political goals revolution and "revolution." In turn, the ruling political elite tried using the levers of power through authoritarian methods and illegal mechanisms of the state machine, in order to preserve themselves as the ruling political elite within the transformed political system ; В данной статье рассмотрены механизмы формирования политических элит, обусловившие восшествие их на высшую ступень властной иерархии в постсоветской Грузии. В труде, в процессе теоретического анализа, проведённого с опорой на эмпирические материалы, тематически описаны механизмы формирования и рекрутирования элит, на примере 4-х правящих политических элит, мобилизованных и консолидированных вокруг З. Гамсахурдия, Э. Шеварнадзе, М. Саакашвили и прозванного «неформальным правителем» Грузии Б. Иванишвили. Эти правящие политические элиты отличались друг от друга с точки зрения идеологических и ценностных ориентиров, определявшая разные пути иерархического восхождения на высшие ступени властных структур современной независимой Грузии. В работе использована двухуровневая форма анализа. В первом случае внимание уделяется теоретическим аспектам механизмов смены власти, таких как выборы и, насыщенная элементами переворота, революция. Во втором случае акцент перенесён на обобщение теоретических компонентов и изучение эмпирико-фактологических вопросов данного материала. В работе также содержится анализ факторов, способствовавших становлению контр-элиты в противовес правящей политической элиты. Также описаны те модели политического поведения, которые контр-элита использовала для захвата власти. В процессе восхождения политических сил непримиримой оппозиции на высшую ступень политической иерархии, они зачастую выходили за допустимые рамки правовых и конституционных норм, добиваясь своих политических целей переворотом и «революцией». В свою очередь, правящая политическая элита всячески старалась, используя властные рычаги с помощью авторитарных методов и незаконных механизмов государственной машины, дабы сохранить за собою статус правящей политической элиты внутри трансформируемой политической системы

National identities, considered a guarantee of successful development, were among the priorities for the five newly independent states that emerged in the territory of what used to be the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan-the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The process began when the Soviet Union still existed: the Soviet Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan adopted laws on language that allowed the Central Asian elites to pass decisions related to the languages used by titular nations. In the post-Soviet years the language policy moved to the fore as one of the key aspects of the gradually emerging national identities treated with special attention at the state level. No matter how similar the processes were, no matter how close the cultures and traditions, each of the Central Asian countries chose its own road, fine-tuned to the specifics of their domestic contexts and the interests of the elites in power. The processes unfolded in full compliance with social continuity, traditions, culture and national languages that survived under Soviet rule. The republics, however, had to take into account the national minorities, including the Russian-speaking populations, in all post-Soviet republics. Inherited from Soviet times, the Russian language was dominant in all of the Central Asian republics, and even preserved much of its influence in the newly independent post-Soviet Central Asian states. This means that they should have opted for a relatively balanced language policy up to and including the continual stage-by-stage contraction of the spheres in which Russian was predominantly used. For obvious reasons they could not push aside their trade and economic relations with Russia and ignore the role of the Soviet cultural and educational heritage. This cushioned the political effects of the Soviet Union's disintegration, partially limited the role of nationalist parties in the newly independent states and helped preserve their educational potential. Shaping national identities in the post-Soviet Central Asian countries was not a smooth, let alone easy, process: societies were far from homogenous, while the regions found it hard to agree to more or less reasonable compromises. This became especially apparent in Kyrgyzstan, which was divided into the southern and northern parts; in Kazakhstan, where the local society was divided into zhuzes; in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, where clans carried a lot of political weight. Thus the elites in power in all of the Central Asian states had no choice but to take into account very different or even clashing interests of informal groups and clans, and tune their policies accordingly. This means that the road towards national identities was far from simple: it meandered between contradictory trends and interests. This also explains the centuries-old mechanism of governance, namely, regional-clan approaches to various problems, which was in place in all of the Central Asian countries, functioning outside the party and state structures. While paying lip service to Communist ideology, leaders of the Central Asian republics invariably took the clan balance of power into account. From the very first days of independence, the Central Asian leaders remained loyal to the conceptual approach to national identities: they concentrated on historical heritage, culture, traditions and national language, the key element of national identity. Despite the fairly long history of their independence, the problem of national identity remains prominent in all of the Central Asian countries. It is intertwined with the problem of the emergence of statehood and development of political systems and the radical geopolitical shifts occurring against the background of mounting economic problems. This cannot but affect the situation in the Central Asian countries in which the process of shaping national identities has not yet been completed.

As the central role of the state in international relations is challenged, many new actors are emerging on the world stage. Today, there are a multitude of international organizations or groups of countries with considerable influence. Among the latter, the BRICS are drawing increasing attention with greater economic and political weight. Calling for the need to build a multipolar world, the ideological approach of the group of five dynamic world economies is intended to unite in a world marked by Western hegemony. It is important to note, however, that the five countries that make up the BRICS have their own specificities, which differentiates them from one another. Apart from the ideological constant that undeniably unites them, the BRICS are above all five distinct economies, five political systems, five foreign policies, to name but a few factors. The author uses a number of criteria to analyze the place of Brazil and South Africa in the BRICS. Referring to the weaknesses of these two countries, the author pays a close attention to their foreign policy approach in the context of BRICS' restructuring of the world order, as well as to the political scandals identified in the last decade at the top of these two countries.

In this paper, the main reasons that led in the post-Soviet period to the process of replacing the ruling classes with the counter-elite are analyzed. In the study, using the dialectical methodology, the authors identify trends and, following them in a logical chain, explain the order of procedures for political elites' circulation. This paper also focuses on the education factor, which significantly determines the process of formation and circulation of political elites in post-Soviet Georgia. If, in the Soviet period, one of the criteria for the formation and recruitment of local elites was local education, the trend in this direction in post-Soviet Georgia has been changed significantly. Education gained in Western, EuropeanAmerican universities has been one of the defining factors in the formation and recruitment of political elites by Georgia since its independence. However, in Georgia, mainly in Tbilisi, there are educational centers, socalled "elite schools", the vast majority of which are attended by children of new Georgians, but according to the criteria of skills, 3-4 percent of schools accept students. This is the first phase of education for junior members of local political and powerful financial groups. The second phase is the migration of graduates of these institutions to higher education institutions of Western countries to get an education. Which makes it easier for returnees to the homeland to integrate into the elite structure. In conclusion, those criteria are set out that are necessary factors for replacing the power elite with the counter-elite.