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Post-colonial nations experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions that foster a unique duo of ideologies. These are the ideology of Historical Recognition versus Negation (or HRN) and the ideology of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). These ideologies operate in tandem to legitimize material and symbolic inequality in response to specific and contested aspects of post-colonial social structure and history. HRN is promoted by the dominant group to legitimize inequality in outcomes experienced by Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies where historical injustice is objective fact (objective historical injustice). SPE is promoted by the dominant group to claim ownership of the national category in post-colonial societies where there is an inability to logically deny that Indigenous peoples "belong" to the nation (undeniable belongingness). I present the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D), which assesses these two distinct "dark" ideologies. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses validated the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in undergraduate (N = 373; Study 1) and community (N = 447; Study 2) samples of New Zealand (NZ) citizens. The PCIS-2D evidenced good construct validity, as SPE and HRN predicted unique variance in voting preferences and social policy attitudes controlling for demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification ideology (Study 2). These results indicate that HRN and SPE are distinct ideologies that explain unique variance in support for a range of social and political issues. At the systemic level, HRN and SPE form a joint ideological system that legitimates inequality in two critical social domains: one relating to resource allocations, the other relating to representation and ownership of the national category.

"Post-colonial nations experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions that foster a unique duo of ideologies. These are the ideology of Historical Recognition versus Negation (or HRN) and the ideology of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). These ideologies operate in tandem to legitimize material and symbolic inequality in response to specific and contested aspects of post-colonial social structure and history. HRN is promoted by the dominant group to legitimize inequality in outcomes experienced by Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies where historical injustice is objective fact (objective historical injustice). SPE is promoted by the dominant group to claim ownership of the national category in post-colonial societies where there is an inability to logically deny that Indigenous peoples 'belong' to the nation (undeniable belongingness). The author presents the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D), which assesses these two distinct 'dark' ideologies. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses validated the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in undergraduate (N=373; Study 1) and community (N=447; Study 2) samples of New Zealand (NZ) citizens. The PCIS-2D evidenced good construct validity, as SPE and HRN predicted unique variance in voting preferences and social policy attitudes controlling for demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification ideology (Study 2). These results indicate that HRN and SPE are distinct ideologies that explain unique variance in support for a range of social and political issues. At the systemic level, HRN and SPE form a joint ideological system that legitimates inequality in two critical social domains: one relating to resource allocations, the other relating to representation and ownership of the national category." (author's abstract)

Post-colonial nations experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions that foster a unique duo of ideologies. These are the ideology of Historical Recognition versus Negation (or HRN) and the ideology of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). These ideologies operate in tandem to legitimize material and symbolic inequality in response to specific and contested aspects of post-colonial social structure and history. HRN is promoted by the dominant group to legitimize inequality in outcomes experienced by Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies where historical injustice is objective fact (objective historical injustice). SPE is promoted by the dominant group to claim ownership of the national category in post-colonial societies where there is an inability to logically deny that Indigenous peoples "belong" to the nation (undeniable belongingness). I present the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D), which assesses these two distinct "dark" ideologies. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses validated the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in undergraduate (N = 373; Study 1) and community (N = 447; Study 2) samples of New Zealand (NZ) citizens. The PCIS-2D evidenced good construct validity, as SPE and HRN predicted unique variance in voting preferences and social policy attitudes controlling for demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification ideology (Study 2). These results indicate that HRN and SPE are distinct ideologies that explain unique variance in support for a range of social and political issues. At the systemic level, HRN and SPE form a joint ideological system that legitimates inequality in two critical social domains: one relating to resource allocations, the other relating to representation and ownership of the national category. Adapted from the source document.

The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology provides a comprehensive review of the psychology of political behaviour from an international perspective. Its coverage spans from foundational approaches to political psychology, including the evolutionary, personality and developmental roots of political attitudes, to contemporary challenges to governance, including populism, hate speech, conspiracy beliefs, inequality, climate change and cyberterrorism. Each chapter features cutting-edge research from internationally renowned scholars who offer their unique insights into how people think, feel and act in different political contexts. By taking a distinctively international approach, this handbook highlights the nuances of political behaviour across cultures and geographical regions, as well as the truisms of political psychology that transcend context. Academics, graduate students and practitioners alike, as well as those generally interested in politics and human behaviour, will benefit from this definitive overview of how people shape - and are shaped by - their political environment in a rapidly changing twenty-first century.

The Dark Duo Model of Post‐Colonial Ideology states that post‐colonial nations possess a specific set of sociostructural conditions that foster a unique pair of complementary ideologies responsible for maintaining the status quo. These are the ideologies of Historical Negation and Symbolic Exclusion. Together, these ideologies articulate a pair of discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires to effectively resolve the collective dissonance created by past—and present—injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples. Historical Negation and Symbolic Exclusion form a joint ideological system that legitimizes inequality in two critical social domains common to all post‐colonial societies: one domain relating to resource allocations for Indigenous peoples and the other domain relating to representation and membership in the nation's identity. In the current article, we review and integrate over 10 years of research on post‐colonial intergroup relations in New Zealand, leading up to a formal presentation of the Dark Duo Model. Our work in this area indicates that Historical Negation and Symbolic Exclusion are psychometrically distinct constructs that are stable over time. A meta‐analytic review of 13 independent samples (N = 18,903) shows that both ideologies are independently associated with Social Dominance Orientation and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism among members of the dominant (European) group in New Zealand. We review and explain why there are systematic ethnic group differences in support for these dual ideologies and why positive intergroup contact with the dominant group attenuates resistance to Symbolic Exclusion amongst Māori (the Indigenous peoples). We also show that Historical Negation and Symbolic Exclusion exert powerful unique effects on voter sentiment and support for different social policies relating to biculturalism and that these ideologies mediate the effects of Social Dominance Orientation and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism on various sociopolitical attitudes. Our Dark Duo Model is a context‐specific extension of the Dual‐Process Model of Ideology and Prejudice that explains how specific post‐colonial ideologies are generated and used to maintain social inequalities that systematically disadvantage Indigenous peoples.

Prior research on personality and politics has largely investigated relationships using national samples from North America and Europe. In contrast, we used multigroup path analysis to assess how Big Five personality, ideological attitudes (RWA, SDO), and group identities (National and Ethnic Identification) predicted right versus left Political Behavior (party support, past voting, present voting intention) across majority and minority ethnic groups in a New Zealand national sample (N = 6,333). The effects of personality on ideological attitudes and group identities were mostly invariant across ethnic groups and consistent with prior findings. In contrast, the effects of ideological attitudes on Political Behavior varied across ethnic groups being moderately strong for the European majority but nonsignificant for the minorities. Group identities had little effect on Political Behavior. We discuss cultural and contextual factors that might account for this disconnect between ideology and politics among the minority ethnic groups.

Research demonstrates that religiosity and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) are positively correlated (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). The extent to which this relationship holds across the population, however, is unknown. Because support for conformity and tradition—values fostered by religion (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004) and consonant with RWA (Altemeyer, 1996)—may be facilitated by the perception that the status quo is fair, endorsement of system-justifying beliefs should moderate the relationship between religiosity and RWA. We tested this hypothesis in a national probability sample of religiously identified New Zealanders ( N = 1,600). As predicted, church attendance was associated with a steep initial increase, followed by a gradual plateau, in RWA. This relationship was, however, stronger for those who were high (vs. low) in system justification. These findings provide the first demonstration that system-justifying beliefs strengthen the relationship between religiosity and RWA, while simultaneously broadening the scope of system justification theory.

Research demonstrates that the Big‐Five's Openness to Experience is inversely associated with political conservatism. This literature, however, implicitly assumes that the strength of this relationship is invariant across the electorate. We challenge this assumption by arguing that education—an institution designed to increase civic competence—affects the degree to which personality predicts various political attitudes. Specifically, we posit that education facilitates people's ability to identify issue positions that (theoretically) resonate with their personality. Using a national probability sample of New Zealand voters (n = 6,518), we show that education consistently moderates the relationship between personality and a host of political attitudes. Whereas Openness to Experience is inversely associated with politically conservative issue positions among the highly educated, it is often uncorrelated with the same attitudes among those with low levels of educational attainment. These results identify an important—though often neglected—moderator of the relationship between personality and political attitudes.

Despite the weight of scientific evidence presented in recent assessment reports of the IPCC, there remains some skepticism among the public that the climate is changing and whether such change is caused by human activity. We modeled climate change belief profiles using Latent Class Analysis in a New Zealand national probability sample (N = 6,072). Roughly 50% of New Zealanders believed that climate change was real and caused by humans, with 30% undecided. The majority of New Zealanders believe that climate change is real and likely caused by humans, with one in six remaining skeptical. We identified two types of climate skeptics, those who did not believe in climate change (7%), and those who believed climate change was real but not caused by humans (10%). Beliefs about the reality of climate change were more predictive than beliefs about human cause of support for carbon emissions policy and self‐reported proenvironmental behavior. Our model indicates that persuading people about the reality of climate change will predict greater incremental variance in behavior and policy attitudes than persuading people of its human cause; although persuading people of both will be still more effective due to the synergistic interaction of these dual beliefs.