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The Lehane matter wound its way through the Cape Provincial Division of the High Court and reached the Supreme Court of Appeal. Mr Dunne, the Irish debtor who had taken up residence in the United States of America, ran an international web of companies, including Lagoon Beach Hotel, which operated a Cape Town hotel. He filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States and soon was also bankrupted by the Irish High Court. The Irish official assignee, Lehane, applied to the Cape court for recognition and assistance, and succeeded at every stage of the South African proceedings. Initially, Steyn J recognised Lehane as the foreign trustee as though a sequestration order had been granted against Mr Dunne in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, thus diverging from the approach taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Singularis Holdings Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers (Bermuda). Subsequently, Yekiso J's approach to applying the Insolvency Act without derogating from its generality opens up the possibility of applying section 21 of the Insolvency Act to significant effect against Mrs Dunne's South African property. Yet the territorialist restriction in Yekiso J's order that only creditors with causes of action which arose in South Africa were entitled to claim against the insolvent estate excluded many foreign creditors, even those from the Republic of Ireland (Eire). Of the many issues raised by the Lagoon Beach Hotel company, two chosen for discussion in this case note are the possible application of the automatic stay under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code 1978 to the South African proceedings, and the standing of Lehane because of the litigants' dispute whether Mr Dunne was domiciled in the United States or Ireland. Yekiso J and subsequently Leach JA held that the American automatic stay did not govern the South African proceedings. Significantly, the American and the Irish trustees were cooperating with respect to proceedings in Ireland and South Africa that involved Mr Dunne. And Leach JA deftly deferred to the Irish court the decision regarding the application of the American automatic stay and its relevance to the Irish proceedings. As for the disputed domicile of Mr Dunne, Yekiso J and Leach JA both considered that Mr Dunne had retained his Irish domicile. Leach JA, though, went on to discuss the assistance that might cautiously be accorded to Lehane if Mr Dunne were domiciled elsewhere than in Ireland. Even then, the relevance of domicile could not be gainsaid. Comparison with the relevant judgments of the Irish courts shows that they also regarded Mr Dunne as having retained his Irish domicile and not having acquired a new domicile of choice in the United States. In the comments, it is pointed out that trustees appointed in countries other than the insolvent's domicile may still be recognised by South African courts. The insolvent's submitting to the jurisdiction of a court that is not the court of his domicile is discussed; on its facts, the cited authority does not bear out the relevant principle. Further, the possibility of recognising non-domiciliary trustees in exceptional circumstances and for exceptional convenience is explored. The cases cited in support of this principle are shown to yield differing results.

Using evidence from voting in the UN General Assembly (UNGA), this article shows that leader turnover, especially in small coalition, nondemocratic systems, increases the likelihood of policy realignment. Autocrats who are beholden to only a small proportion of the population represent the foreign policy interests of their small number of supporters. When leader turnover occurs, the interests represented often shift too and this results in an increased volatility and regression toward a neutral position of a nation's alignment at the United Nations vis-à-vis the United States. While such realignments can offer an opportunity to reduce enmity between states, they can also signal growing differences between friends. The impact of leaders change in large coalitions produces more moderate shifts in alignments.

Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner's dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

Although International Organizations (IOs) have the ability to promote
economic and political development throughout the world, political
imperatives ensure that they will fail to meet their potential. This essay
is a response to the editor's kind request to speculate as to the
role of IOs over the next decade. Although my arguments apply broadly,
here I consider development, and so I focus on organizations such as the
World Bank and IMF. Over the coming decades these organizations will fail
in their attempts to alleviate poverty. On a more positive note, political
science is rapidly advancing our understanding of the pathologies of IOs.
Unfortunately, the failure of IOs to alleviate poverty is, I believe, a
politically stable circumstance: intellectual advances will not translate
into better-performing IOs. I focus on a specific set of theoretical
arguments as to why IOs fail to promote development, concluding that we
should anticipate more of the same rather than the radical reforms that
are necessary if IOs are to achieve their stated goals.

A contribution to a symposium, "Ten Years from Now," argues that International Organizations (IOs) like the World Bank & the International Monetary Fund will continue to fall short of their development goals over the next 10 years. Theoretical arguments that explain why IOs fail to alleviate poverty are examined, including Kenneth Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem, & hypotheses related to coalition size, the misappropriation of resources, & the link between political reforms & development programs. Attention is also given to the impact of organizational structure within IOs on the success/failure of development programs. Although IOs produce plans for policy reforms, little is done to evaluate why previous plans were never implemented, & most IOs do not have the leverage to persuade leaders to introduce important political reforms that have the potential to jeopardize their tenures in office. It is concluded that the well-intentioned programs of IOs often "help maintain the very political regimes whose policies produce poverty" & suggested that IOs should do less rather than more over the next decade. 9 References. J. Lindroth

I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expectations, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels.

I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expections, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)