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The impact of pollution and abatement policy within a stochastic endogenous growth model is analyzed. Environmental care is provided by the government and financed through income taxation and government bonds. Due to environmental preferences and partial perception of the individual's impact on pollution, government debt influences equilibrium growth. Hence, there is an additional growth effect of income taxation due to portfolio adjustment. It is shown that the optimal income tax rate decreases with the perception of the influence of individuals on aggregate capital. In contrast, the impact of environmental preferences and uncertainty on optimal environmental policy is ambiguous.

This paper analyzes the impact of pollution and abatement policy within a stochastic endogenous growth model. The agents have environmental preferences, but they neglect their individual contribution to aggregate abatement. Therefore, environmental care is done by the government and financed via income taxation and government bonds. Equilibrium growth depends on environmental preferences, perception of aggregate capital and risk aversion. Environmental care as well as fiscal policy are analyzed. Due to environmental preferences and partial anticipation of the dependence between aggregate and individual capital, government debt influences equilibrium growth. Hence, income taxation has an additional indirect impact on accumulation through the simultaneous adjustment of portfolio choice. From numerical simulation it can be concluded that the optimal income tax rate decreases with the perception of the influence of individual on aggregate capital. In contrast, the impact of environmental preferences and uncertainty on optimal financing is ambiguous.

AbstractThe paper considers stochastic environmental policy and its effects on the environment, portfolio composition, and economic growth. Capital accumulation causes pollution which is reduced by private green services and public abatement. The government subsidizes green services and taxes dirty capital albeit at a rate which may become random, causing unexpected capital write-offs. Tax jumps depend on natural degradation and environmental activism. We derive how uncertainty and political activism affect the risk premia for investors. We analyze the incentives for firms to increase the greenness of production in order to reduce political uncertainty. Stochastic taxation is shown to act as a substitute for green subsidies when uncertainty decreases in the ratio of green services to capital and agents use their green activities strategically. Tax uncertainty may trigger precautionary savings, causing additional growth and enhanced environmental deterioration.

This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.

This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political ...

This paper analyzes within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on agglomeration. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. Scale effects act as agglomeration force and in addition to private capital agglomeration increase the concentration of the public input. Integration promotes dispersion forces with respect to the distribution of physical capital which are based on decreasing private returns. However, within the governments' decision on the concentration of the public input, increasing integration reinforces agglomeration because it promotes the interregional productive use of the public input. Taking feedback effects between the private and the public sector into account leads to mutual reinforcement, hence agglomeration forces almost always dominate and the spreading equilibrium becomes unstable. If convergence is a separate (additional) political objective, it needs sustained additional political effort.

We analyze within a spatial endogenous growth setting the impact of public policy coordination on regional inequality. Governments in each of the two symmetric regions provide a local public input that becomes globally effective due to integration. Micro-foundation of governmental behavior is based on three different coordination schemes: autarky, full or partial coordination. The "optimal" size of the local public inputs - as measured by the expenditure share ratios - differs depending upon the extent to which the governments take interregional interdependencies and feedback effects into account. The resulting spatial distribution of economic activity is driven by integration, which acts as dispersion force, and scale effects, which act as concentration force. The latter are drivers of regional inequality. Given full symmetry, local externalities cancel w.r.t to their impact on spatial concentration. We show that coordination of public decisions that base on productivity considerations unequivocally foster concentration and destabilize the spreading equilibrium. Regional inequality is thus an optimal result or put differently, the convergence goal can only be met by applying additional arguments.

Standard environmental economics prescribes policies which are optimal and implemented immediately. The paper argues that, in reality, environmental policy often deviates from the optimum and implementation is not deterministic but subject to major uncertainty and frequent change. We present a model with a stochastic policy process that affects investors' decisions and the composition of capital. We assume that pollution is reduced by private green services and public abatement. The government subsidizes green services and taxes dirty capital albeit at a rate which may become random, causing unexpected capital write-offs. Tax jumps depend on environmental degradation and the share of green services. We show how policy uncertainty affects capital valuation and how it alters individual portfolios, green services, and economic growth.