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AbstractThe subject of national debt raises serious questions concerning state identity. Should a state that has radically altered its constitution be responsible for decisions taken by the previous state? Much hangs on how we characterize the state as a continuous agent. This article explores debates over national debt, state integrity, and corruption in the eighteenth century, the era in which the modern financial‐bureaucratic state was in its infancy. Many eighteenth‐century writers treated national debt as corrupting; some advocated voluntary default as a manner of laying low the insidious "moneyed interests" usurping political power. But if public debt was attacked by some as the soul of corruption, others saw it as something that had been made possible by—and was a guarantor of—integrity. These controversies reveal a clash of visions of what constitutes state integrity. This same clash is alive in contemporary debates about national debts.

AbstractPartisanship inspires a degree of ambivalence. There is a widespread tendency—which has a long history in republican political thought—to decry division and partisanship as corrupting, undermining individual judgment, and promoting clientelism, dependencies and loyalties antithetical to the common good. Yet there is an equally widespread intuition that excessive unity is corrupting, undermining the vigour of civic life. Contemporary political theory remains divided on the normative implications of division and unity—witness the battles between agonistic and consensus-oriented schools of democratic theory. In this article I examine the thought of two eighteenth-century writers who, while often treated as contributing to a common intellectual project of reinvigorating classical civic virtue, took opposite positions on the desirability of division. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson offered competing accounts of what corrupts civic virtue, one decrying party divisions and the other lauding them. The article examines the underlying philosophical presuppositions of Rousseau and Ferguson's competing claims and suggests, ultimately, that both positions suffer from neglecting to attend to an important distinction between salutary and harmful divisions.

Étienne de La Boétie (1530–63) is a central, if enigmatic, figure in modern French political philosophy. While his name is most famous for his friendship with Montaigne, his Discours de la servitude volontaire (Discourse of Voluntary Servitude) is a tour-de-force of humanist political writing, a youthful paean to liberty arguing that subjection to tyrants is the result of popular corruption. This article argues that the text can be read as a reflection on the perils and promise of transparency. Reading La Boétie helps us see two radically different ways in which members of a polity can be known to one another – two models of transparency – and it offers an important, but ultimately unsettling, political ideal based on a classical conception of civic friendship. The article draws out the importance of this ideal for modern anti-corruption efforts.

The concept of dependence is central both to the study of modern republicanism and to the study of systemic corruption. Recently, Lawrence Lessig has described American politics as suffering from "dependency corruption," a type of institutional corruption about which eighteenth-century republican writers were extremely worried. This article examines the use of the concept "dependence" in the current "neo-roman" republican theory stemming from Quentin Skinner, Maurizio Viroli, and particularly Philip Pettit. The article argues that the term dependence has two essentially distinct inflections, one relating to outright domination (subjection to arbitrary power) and the other relating to a condition of material subordinacy (dependency corruption). If liberty is the "the absence of dependence on the will of others," it is extremely important to determine just what independence entails. This article suggests that dependency corruption was a dominant concern of the modern republican tradition, but it is a concern that is largely ignored in today's new republicanism. By way of a foray into the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century sources employed by the new republicans, the article attempts to revive a manner of thinking about corruption that risks being lost to view.

AbstractSimone Weil had an ambivalent attitude toward Marx. While she thought that the young Marx's celebration of labor had "lyrical accents," she ultimately believed that Marx had neglected his own insights, embracing a blind worship of mechanization and a theory of history and revolution that was insufficiently attentive to the material conditions of workers. Marx, in her view, was insufficiently materialist and excessively wedded to a hierarchical model of science that maintained the domination of management. Weil and Marx's attitudes toward the dignity of labor and the necessary conditions for socialism are analyzed. The most significant cleavage between them is ultimately due to the differing manner in which they conceive of the relationship between thought and action. Through this comparison, the philosophical underpinnings of the two radically different conceptions of labor and its dignity as a human activity are explained.