Privatization and liberalization in vertically linked markets
In: TranState working papers 95
Search results
Filter
99 results
Sort by:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Cooperation in a resource extraction game
In: Kieler Arbeitspapiere 846
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Competitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy models
In: Kiel working paper 858
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Competitiveness and environmental policies in a dynamic model
In: Kiel working paper 859
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Book(print)#61996
Bargaining in a long-term relationship and the Rubinstein solution
In: Kieler Arbeitspapiere 759
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
The market entry paradox
In: Kiel working paper 777
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Stock-dependent uncertainty and optimal resource exploitation
In: Kiel working paper 728
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Book(print)#111993
On international compensations for environmental stocks
In: Kiel working papers 580
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
On the economics of international environmental agreements
In: Kieler Arbeitspapiere 600
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Checking availability at your location
This book is also available at your library:
Article(electronic)#15August 6, 2022
An optimal investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
In: Journal of economics, Volume 138, Issue 1, p. 1-16
ISSN: 1617-7134
AbstractMany investment treaties include investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions which are supposed to protect a foreign investor against opportunistic behavior of a host country. This paper scrutinizes the optimal design of ISDS provisions that solve the holdup problem. It shows that an efficient investor protection mechanism requires an arbitrator as established in investment treaties. However, this arbitrator does neither have to learn nor to evaluate the circumstances of the dispute. Furthermore, any ISDS compensation from the government to the investor should not be based on reductions in investor profits but on the host country's welfare effects.
Checking availability at your location
This article is also available at your library: |
electronic
print