Search results

How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Examines plans for NATO expansion, potential power and dangers of a Russia-China alliance, objections and rebuttals to admitting Russia to NATO, and Chinese reaction to it.

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war is one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged its theoretical development. To date, the theory has been tested on only 707 dyad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a broader test of War and Reason's expected utility theory of war using the same methods as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman. Our tests include the full international system from 1816 to 1984. We find that the theory receives empirical support using the set of politically relevant dyads for testing, but the relationship is less clear among the population of all interstate dyads. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Researchers face three basic questions when testing theoretically driven hypotheses. First is research design: for example, what population should be analyzed, what sample should be drawn from that population, & what cases should be excluded from the sample? What statistical estimator should one use? What set of control variables should one employ? Results drawn from several permutations of the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute data set are compared using three statistical models. For some theories & variables (international institutionalism -- intergovernmental organization & alliance membership; realism -- balance of power; expected utility theory -- international interaction game equilibria), research design & estimator choices substantially influence the findings. For others (trade & democratic peace theory), the relationship between the dependent & independent variables is relatively impervious to research design & estimator choices. 7 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.